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ABSTRACT
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
BY
BAYAR TUMENNASAN
APRIL 22, 2005

Committee Chair: Dr. Roy W. Bahl
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation explores the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
corruption. Theoretically, it is shown that decentralization has a potential to induce public
officials to reduce the bribes they charge from entrepreneurs. That would encourage firms
to enter the economy. Consistent with the theoretical model, we find empirical evidence
that suggests that fiscal decentralization causes public officials to reduce the bribes they
charge per firm; thus decentralization lowers the bribery cost to entrepreneurs. Empirical
analysis is based on cross country study and panel data study where appropriate.
Secondly, not all aspects of fiscal decentralization have an equal impact on
corruption. Based on a cross state analysis, we find that states that decentralize revenue
raising authority and give more revenue authority to local governments were perceived to
be less corrupt. Cross state analysis is appealing because many of the political and
institutional factors are held fixed.

viii

Overall, the findings suggest that fiscal decentralization can potentially help to
control public corruption and create favorable conditions for the private sector. If revenue
authorities are devolved to subnational levels, then the effect might be even greater. The
effects of various aspects of decentralization on corruptibility of government and the
quality of public office have not been tested before and are of great interest to
policymakers. These finding are of great interest to developing and transition countries
trying to control corruption.

ix

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of corruption started to receive an increased attention of economists
from the new interest in the role of government in development, especially in developing
and transition countries. “People living with ineffective states have long suffered the
consequences in terms of postponed growth and social development,” and now there is a
general consensus among economists and policy makers that corruption-free government
is necessary for development, not the other way around (World Bank 1997).
One of the trends in fiscal reform is advocating fiscal decentralization, especially
in developing and transition countries. The attributes of successful decentralization such
as increased bureaucratic competition and greater transparency could be keys to a
successful economic approach against corruption (Jain 2001; Martinez-Vazquez and
McNab 2003; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). The question that is
raised in my dissertation is whether fiscal decentralization can reduce the opportunities
for corruption in the public sector.
What is corruption? Corruption is a broad concept. Examples of corruption--from
match-rigging in sumo wrestling Duggan and Levitt (2002) to illegal privatization
schemes in the 1990s in Russia Klebnikov (2000)--are abundant. The corruption cases in
different sectors or different countries are not all the same. What people call corruption in
some societies may well be the norms in others (de Sardan 1999). Also, people have
different views of corruption depending on the sector of the economy where it occurs,
i.e., corruption of courts is viewed as more problematic than embezzlement
(Transparency International 2002). Therefore, it is necessary to limit our focus of study to
particular aspects of corruption. The commonly used definition of corruption comes from

1

2
the World Bank. They define corruption as an abuse of public office power for private
gains. This definition is simple yet broad enough to capture most forms of corruption in
the public sector.
What does a public officer do that can be called abuse of public office power for
private gain, and how? The public sector is run by numerous bureaucrats and governed
by elected or appointed officials. Some of them may engage in some form of corruption
such as bribery, embezzlement, extortion, or favoritism (Admundsen 2000). Corruption
can take place on revenue side or expenditure side of the budget, or outside the budget in
quasi-fiscal transactions such as the imposition of regulations (Martinez-Vazquez et al.
2004). The way they engage in corrupt activities can differ structurally as well.
Corruption can be grand, mostly practiced by high level officials or petty, which common
among lower level bureaucrats; corruption can be organized, just like in a criminal
syndicate or competitive with not clear organization (Celentani and Ganuza 2002; Waller
et al. 2002).
Let us briefly overview the forms of corruption. First, a major form of corruption
is embezzlement, which is a theft of public resources. This is a classic example of
corruption on expenditure side of the budget. In some countries embezzlement is a major
problem (Transparency International 2004c). State officials steal from the public
institution where they are employed, or even the leaders steal from the treasury. For
example, during his years in power, Mohamed Suharto of Indonesia allegedly stole up to
$US35 billion from the country (Hodess et al. 2004). As far as the sum of money
embezzled goes, the Suharto case is an extreme. But embezzlement of public resources is
a common problem. When everybody steals small amounts the consequences can be as
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negative as when the leader steals big. For example, during the last few decades before
the collapse of the Soviet Union, vast amounts of public resources were regularly stolen
by factory workers, office workers etc. (Silber 1994).
Another form of corruption is extortion. Usually extortion is associated with
organized criminals who impose their influence on government officials or businesses
through threats and intimidations. For example, the “mafia” may obtain preferential
business opportunities or freedom from taxation and legal prosecution by blackmailing
certain state officials. But the opposite can happen. Government officials may extort
money from individuals and businesses through threats of strict taxation, delays in
issuing licenses, police inspections, or sanitary inspections. That is especially true in
countries with a weak rule of law. In those countries the government officials may even
have an incentive to further complicate the rules and regulations with sole purpose of
being able to selectively enforce those rules and extort money from the businesses and
individuals (Admundsen 2000).
Besides, corruption does not have to be associated only with money. Corruption
can and does take the form of favoritism, which is a disposition to favor and promote the
interest of one person or persons to the disregard of others having equal claims.
Privatization, natural resource exploitation, regulations also provide ample opportunities
for officials to play favorites and extract personal gains. Nepotism is another form of
favoritism. A classic example of nepotism is hiring and promotion of individuals based
on family or other personal relations rather than merit. This form of corruption also
involves public office power to hire or promote someone. The person who abuses that
power benefits from it, although not necessarily in monetary terms (Admundsen 2000).
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Money laundering, tax evasion, black market activities, or drug trafficking are not of
interest in this study, because they do not necessarily involve abuse of public office (Jain
2001). For example, counterfeiting, telemarketing or internet scams do not have to
involve any elected official or civil servants. These are mostly illegal activities by private
agents, and you do not have to be a public official to engage in these types of criminal
activities.
Lastly, bribery is one the more common form of corruption. Bribery can
accompany corruption on either side of the budget, and outside of it as well. Individuals
or organizations offer bribes to government officials who can make contracts on behalf of
the state or make decisions on using public funds to influence their decisions regarding
particular tasks. Bribes are also known as kickbacks, gratuities, pay-offs, grease money
etc. Outside the budget, the privatization process can be greatly influenced by bribery
(Klebnikov 2000). On the revenue side of the budget, tax collection agents can accept
bribes to lower the tax liabilities of bribe offering individuals or businesses. Encyclopedia
Britannica defines bribery as “the act of promising, giving, receiving, or agreeing to
receive money or some other item of value with the corrupt aim of influencing a public
official in the discharge of his official duties. When money has been offered or promised
in exchange for a corrupt act, the official involved need not actually accomplish that act
for the offense of bribery to be complete. The crime is typically punishable as a felony.”
Bribery is a classic form of corruption, and it conforms to the definition of corruption by
the World Bank. There is an official who abuses his public office powers entrusted with
him to gain private monetary benefits in form of bribes.
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For the analysis of public corruption within the scope of this thesis, we narrow the
definition of corruption to bribery. According to the Bribe Payers Index Transparency
International (2002), officials in the public works and the construction sector were the
most likely to demand or accept bribes, followed by the arms and defense, oil and gas
sectors. The biggest bribes are likely to be paid in public works and construction sector,
followed by arms and defense sector. These sectors are all major components of the
economy and the government is usually responsible for them in most of the countries.
Now let us shift to the question of who acts in a corrupt manner. First, corruption
is called “grand” when high level public officials abuse their power for personal use
(Transparency International 2004c). In other words, grand corruption occurs when those
who are entitled to formulate, establish and implement the laws in the name of the
people, or who have decision-making power over processes of significant economic
value, are themselves corrupt, and use the political power they are entrusted with to
sustain their power and wealth. It is when policy formulation and legislation is tailored to
benefit politicians and legislators. “From outright vote-buying to selling preferential
access, political corruption presents a significant challenge,” and corruption of the
political process has a severe damaging effect on democracies around the world
(Transparency International 2004b). Corrupt practices such as acceptance of bribes or
kickbacks from those who seek government tender and procurements may qualify as
grand corruption as well. As we go down the chain of command, we may observe “petty”
corruption.
Petty, also known as administrative or bureaucratic, corruption is found among
underpaid civil servants who in many countries often have to depend on small
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contributions from the public to meet their basic needs. An example of this type of
corruption is an acceptance of bribes for issuing licenses, passports, or providing basic
public service. Letting a briber ahead of line on a waiting list for setting up a basic
telephone line is a common petty corruption in less developed countries, where the public
utilities are in a short supply (Clarke and Xu 2004). Although petty corruption is more
noticeable, people are more concerned about the consequences of grand corruption.
When asked what institution they would prefer to see free of corruption, people choose
the courts, political parties, customs and police, rather than utilities or passport offices
(Transparency International 2002). People consider grand corruption a more serious
problem than petty corruption (Transparency International 2004c). Maybe it is because
people do not directly benefit from grand corruption, whereas petty corruption allows
people to avoid inefficient bureaucracy. Explaining why people see grand and petty
corruption differently would be an interesting future research question.
How the corrupt officials operate is another interesting question. Corruption takes
a bottom-up structure when the lower level officials set the bribe rate and collect bribes
and then share the illegal incomes with the higher ranking officials. Higher officials in
turn close their eyes and enforce the law only when the lower level officials fail to share
their revenues. In other words, if bureaucrats act in such a way as to maximize their own
individual utilities one will observe a competitive bottom-up corruption. On the other
hand when higher level official coordinates the bribe rate and collects the bribe revenues
and gives shares to the lower levels, we call that top-down corruption. In this organized
top-down corruption the higher level official will oversee the corruption decisions of the
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population of bureaucrats in such a way as to maximize the total corruption proceeds
(Waller et al. 2002).
Until recently, corruption was often overlooked and considered a taboo subject.
Following (Leff 1964), there was even some tendency to view corruption as “grease” that
helps to turn the wheels of commerce, especially in developing countries. Faced with
rigid, inefficient and highly bureaucratic governments in less developed countries, the
western companies often viewed bribery as a way around the system.
In some extreme cases, corruption may in fact have short term benefits for the
economy. For example, faced with very high price inflation, due to administrative and
delays and partial breakdown, government will find itself unable to raise the salaries to
match the cost of living. Systematic bribery or illegal fees can be the only means by
which the government keeps going (Morgan 1964). The rapid increase in corruption in
transition economies during the economic downturn following the collapse of the
centrally planned economic systems can be partly explained by the above argument.
Corruption may have helped to keep the government going during the economically hard
times. But as the economy stabilizes the corruption may not go away that easily.
It is hard to measure the costs of corruption quantitatively because of its secretive
nature. But the World Bank Institute estimates that the corruption cuts around 4 percent
off the world's economic wealth each year, worth about $US1 trillion. Transparency
International estimates that at least $US400 billion is lost per year due to bribery in
government procurement worldwide. There are some estimates of costs caused by
individuals. According to the Transparency International, Ferdinand Marcos of
Philippines embezzled up to US$ 10 billion during his presidency from 1972 to 1986.
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Strikingly, another president of Philippines, Joseph Estrada, is on the list of top ten
corrupt politicians. While serving as the president of Philippines from 1998-2001, he
stole around US$80 million.
The above mentioned $US1 trillion in monetary costs are estimates of the amount
of money spent on bribery only. This estimate does not capture lost opportunities for
individuals, decrease in private investments, misuse of public funds, or reduction in basic
public services that may result from corruption in government. Qualitatively the
consequences of corruption are likely to be far more devastating for both the economy
and society. Corruption undermines the purpose of government, and imposes enormous
economic, political, and social costs.
The conventional justification for government intervention is correction of market
failures. When markets fail (public goods, externalities etc.) the government steps in. But
government can fail if it creates inefficient rules and regulations. Some people believe
that corruption can correct the government failure by allowing individuals to avoid the
inefficient regulations (Leff 1964). But, corruption does not distinguish between good
and bad rules and regulations. Thus corruption is likely to fail to correct the government
failure. Corruption diminishes the whole purpose of having the government because
corruption distorts all three major functions of government, namely macroeconomic
stabilization, income redistribution and resource allocation1.
Different people respond differently to government interventions, such as
taxation. For example, if someone does not want to pay taxes on alcohol, he either can
avoid taxes by not consuming alcohol, or evade taxes by not paying the taxes, or corrupt

1

According to (Musgrave 1959)the government has three economic functions, which include
macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution and allocation of resources.
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the system by bribing the tax officer thus not paying taxes yet still consuming the alcohol.
The difference between the last two is that with tax evasion you risk being caught
cheating, while with corruption you try to reduce the probability of being caught if the
anti-corruption policies that target those doing the bribing are not strict. If corruption is
widespread then the incentive of most of the people is to corrupt the system to evade
taxes. Consequently, the presence of corruption makes government policies ineffective,
and with fewer people paying taxes the governments may raise tax rates to inefficient
levels thus reducing the total tax revenues (Chander and Wilde 1992; Johnson et al. 2000;
Litwack 2002; Sanyal et al. 2000).
On the expenditure side, corrupt government officials are likely to be interested in
“white elephant” projects. It is apparently easier to hide thefts of public funds in
outrageous budgets for huge infrastructure projects such as building of dams and roads.
Tender, bidding, and procurement all provide ample opportunities to steal the money
without the public knowing about it Transparency International (2005), whereas
education and cultural activities are the areas where the officials see few opportunities to
extract any benefits for themselves (Mauro 1998). Lower tax revenues combined with
larger inefficient government expenditures lead to greater budget deficits, thus weakening
the stabilization role of government.
Taxation naturally creates distortions in the economic system. But the taxation is
justified on the grounds that the government uses the collected revenues to provide public
goods. If tax revenues go to the corrupt individuals in charge of collecting taxes rather
than the Treasury, then there is an even greater distortion. Thus on efficiency grounds the
corruption is not desirable. Sometimes regressive taxes such as payroll taxes are justified
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because the recipients of the social welfare programs are less wealthy ones. However, if
the tax revenues go to the hands of corrupt ones, the taxation becomes more regressive.
Generally, the real incomes of those who engage in corrupt activities increase relative to
those who do not because tax structures are usually modified in favor of those who can
influence the officials, thus leading to greater income inequality (Hindriks et al. 1999).
When the corruption is widespread, the elected officials become less interested in
financing social programs because they are likely to be interested in diverting and
stealing the public resources for their own benefit, thus contributing to inequality and an
increase in poverty.
Lastly, corrupt governments create unequal conditions for firms to operate by
favoring bribe-paying businesses, for example, awarding government contracts or
licenses not to the most efficient firms but to the ones that offer bribes Tanzi (1998a) or
the ones that pay the greatest bribes. In some cases, virtually every firm is required to pay
bribes just to stay in business. Thus corruption increases the cost of business to firms
through the price of illicit payments, and the management cost of negotiating with
officials. A heavy burden of corruption is also likely to drive businesses out of official
sector into shadow economy (Friedman et al. 2000; Schneider and Enste 2000).
Corruption also can make firms hide their output to dodge taxes and discourage foreign
direct investments, because corruption worsens the environment in which private sector
has to operate ((Johnson et al. 2000; Wei 1997b). In the public sector, by diverting public
investment away from education into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are
more plentiful, officials create economic distortions (Mauro 1998). Choice of inefficient
public investment projects undertaken by the government may slow down the economic
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growth (Mauro 1995). Corruption also lowers compliance with construction,
environmental, or other regulations, which will result in poor quality roads, bridges, etc.
The human toll and economic devastation following the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, or
the 2001 earthquake in India, could have been minimized had there been stricter
inspection of buildings or the building codes had been followed. The endemic corruption
in the construction sector was to blame for some the damages (Transparency International
2005).
Negative consequences of corruption in the public sector are not limited to the
economic costs alone. Social costs of corruption are substantial. Corruption has a
damaging effect on the quality of public services. Child mortality rates in countries with
high corruption are about one-third higher than in countries with low corruption; infant
mortality rates and percent of low-birth weight babies are almost twice as high, and
dropout rates are five times as high (Gupta et al. 2000). That suggests that corruption
distracts governments from fulfilling the obligations to maintain acceptable level of
immunization and public health efforts. In other words, corrupt governments are not
accountable to the people for providing substandard public health care and public
education. But it is important to note that there might be some simultaneity in the
corruption-bad outcome linkage. When social conditions are bad and there is little what
the governments can do about it, there is a likelihood that the officials will not even try to
improve the situation and try to steal while in the office.
Besides having a deteriorating effect on public health or education, corruption
imposes political costs as well. Corruption of government erodes the institutional
capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and
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officials are hired or promoted with no regard to performance. Corruption undermines the
legitimacy of government and such democratic values as trust and tolerance. There is a
saying that “a fish rots from the head.” When politicians and senior officials are corrupt,
the public sees little reason not to be corrupt. If there is no political will at the higher
levels of government to curb corruption, the epidemic is likely to spread to every layer of
the society.
As we can see, corruption of government has far reaching implications for the
whole country. Economic, political and social costs of corruption are enormous and any
country would be better off without corruption. For example, if a country such as Egypt
were to heighten the efficiency of its administration and improve its corruption score of 4
out of 10 to the same level as Argentina’s 6, the rate of investment would increase by 3
percent and the growth rate would increase by 0.5 percent2 (Mauro 1997). An increase in
the corruption-induced uncertainly level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico, at the
average level of corruption in the sample, is equivalent to raising the tax rate by 32
percentage points (Wei 1997a).
Clearly lower or no corruption is desirable for any country. But what can
countries do to reduce corruption if corruption is already widespread? The literature
suggests a number of ways to fight corruption. Mostly these suggestions can be divided
into some combinations of “stick” and “carrot.” Some advocate a tougher prosecution of
corruption, while others suggest offering incentives not to engage in corruption. Although
both of these are important tools in fight against corruption, they might be too costly and
not as productive as one would hope for.

2

0 means total corruption and 10 means none at all
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Tougher prosecution of corruption requires extensive monitoring and creation of
monitoring agencies. Most of the time the agencies are created at the central government
level, and assuming the central governments are benevolent, they could be effective.
Successful practices are creation of independent anti-corruption commissions.
International anti-corruption watchdogs are becoming increasingly influential.
Lower wages may create incentives for government officials to engage in
corruption to supplement their low official wage income. However, raising wages in
developing countries may place a heavy burden on the budget. Often, a raise in public
sector wages translates into higher inflation rates thus leading to no change in real wages.
High income countries are likely to be able to afford to raise wages of civil servants
sufficiently high enough to curb the incentive to accept bribes. For example, Singapore
provides an example of successful anti-corruption effort using both tougher prosecution
and higher wages. But we have to keep in mind that Singapore is a wealthy city state.3
Small size and high per capita income make it relatively easier to monitor the officials
and provide enough incentives to government officers to curb the corruption. The success
story of Singapore is not easily replicated in other larger countries or countries with less
income per capita.
Long term fix could be found in public sector reforms that would reduce the range
and the value of transactions that can potentially be exploited by corrupt officials. The
corruption literature stresses the importance of economic rents associated with
investments and the strengths of political institutions in combating corruption (Jain
2001). Various fiscal and structural reforms are likely to influence the corruption. Given

3

According to the (World Bank 2004), Singapore has a population of 4.1 million and GDP per capita $US
27,254 as of 2002.
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the high level of corruption, countries could reform their fiscal systems to reduce the
costs of corruption. For example, in the presence of corruption consumption taxes are
preferred to income taxation (Alm and Barreto 2003).
As we’ve mentioned earlier, one of the trends in fiscal reform is advocating fiscal
decentralization in developing and transition countries. The attributes of successful
decentralization such as increased bureaucratic competition and greater transparency are
the keys to a successful economic approach against corruption (Jain 2001; MartinezVazquez and McNab 2003; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). The
question is can fiscal decentralization reduce the opportunities for corruption in the public
sector?
The extant literature mainly suggests that greater accountability of decentralized
government and interjurisdictional competition can potentially deter the spread of
corruption in government. The interjurisdictional competition argument has received little
attention and there is much to be explored. The “voting with one’s feet” argument by
Tiebout (1956) is the basic principle of horizontal competition. The critiques may argue
that citizens often lack the necessary mobility across jurisdictions for the gains from
horizontal competition to emerge. The issue of vertical competition with regards to
corruption is virtually untouched. Vertical competition is usually defined as a competition
between the tiers of government. Usually, vertical competition is associated with
competition between the federal government and state governments who have certain
legislative authorities (Breton 1996). Most economic studies of corruption employ
principle-agent model. Usually the principle is the central government and the agent is a
bureaucrat who takes bribes from the private individuals interested in public goods and
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services. Vertical competition is an important complement to horizontal competition,
because it does not require physical movement of residents across jurisdictions. Since the
central government is in a unique position as defined by the constitution, the only way to
subject it to competition is through vertical competition (Breton 1996; Knutsen 1992).
In this thesis we will analyze the vertical competition that comes with
decentralization and the implications for corruptibility of government officials. In
general, vertical competition is associated with federal systems. But vertical competition
can occur between the central government and subnational governments in a unitary state
(Breton and Fraschini 2003). The nice aspect of vertical competition is that in a
decentralized system, people are citizens of all tiers of government and do not have to
have perfect mobility to make choices between the government tiers.
We contribute to the empirical literature on corruption, by analyzing the link
between corruption and decentralization by using alternative measures of actual
corruption for cross country analysis. Where appropriate, we use panel data analysis as
well. Also we analyze the link between corruption and decentralization in the United
States. We contribute to the literature by testing the relationship between corruption and
different aspects of decentralization, such as revenue autonomy, and fiscal accountability.
First, reliable fiscal data are available for the states in the United States. For example,
availability of own source revenue data make it possible to measure revenue autonomy of
local governments. Second, cross state analysis would allow us to hold fixed some
political and cultural factors that are difficult to control in cross country analysis of
corruption and decentralization.
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The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the current
literature on corruption, decentralization, and the relationship between the two. Chapter 3
discusses the theoretical model, and Chapter 4 describes the variables, discusses the
econometric estimations and reports the results. The final chapter is the conclusion.

CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW
One can find evidence of corruption in both public and private sectors virtually in
every country. However, comparative studies show that corruption is pervasive in less
developed countries. For example, according to the Corruption Perception Index
Transparency International (2004a), corruption is perceived to be rampant in lower
income countries such as Indonesia, Kenya, Angola, Madagascar, Paraguay, Nigeria and
Bangladesh. However, that does not suggest that corruption scandals are not unheard of
in developed countries.
Abuse of public office power for personal gain or corruption of government is a
very old problem, and you can find the stories of corrupt behavior even in ancient
civilizations (Bardhan 1997). Until recently, corruption of government was often
tolerated and treated as a norm. In countries like South Korea the economy performed
extremely well, despite the corruption in government. Even one of the G7 member
countries, Italy, ranks poorly in terms of corruption. In states which suppressed the free
market, bribery could sometimes be seen as a way around the inefficient oppressive
government machine. The “grease money” argument says that when government is
inefficient and oppressing, the bribery could help firms to overcome that obstacle and
increase efficiency (Leff 1964). Western companies tolerated corrupt practices in
developing countries as a necessary part of the way of conducting business in those
countries. It is possible that to the westerners the cost of resisting the corrupt activities
often outweighed the benefits.
Since the mid 1990s such tolerance of corruption has effectively ended. Is it
because there is more corruption or it is in someone’s interest to reduce corruption? One
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cannot definitely identify the reasons why. Lack of adequate data prevents us from
answering that question clearly. A greater number of democratized countries, increased
freedom of media, access to information, reliance on markets, efforts of non government
organizations, the end of Cold War, globalization, and the efforts by the United States are
all behind the increased interest in corruption (Tanzi 1998b).
Whatever the reasons, the attempts to quantify and address the issue
internationally brought people around the world to express concerns about corruption in
their governments. The Gallup International Millennium Survey reveals that roughly 90
percent of people in different countries characterize their governments as corrupt and
bureaucratic as opposed to efficient, just and responsive to the will of people.4
International watchdogs such as Transparency International report increasing trends in
perceptions of corruption worldwide.
Multilateral lenders like the World Bank and the IMF, and the OECD, who had
been constrained from assisting countries to fight corruption, started to emphasize anticorruption efforts starting in mid 1990s. For example, the World Bank significantly
stepped up its efforts under current President James Wolfensohn, following the landmark
speech on corruption at the 1996 IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting. Since then, the Bank
has launched over 600 anti-corruption programs in nearly 100 countries5. Yet the latest
information from Transparency International report increased perception of corruption in
many countries around the world. Why does corruption not go away?

4
5

http://www.gallup-international.com/survey5.htm
http://www.worldbank.org
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The Reasons Why Corruption Persists
Issuing laws is not sufficient to control the country. The laws have to be carried
out by the numerous bureaucrats, who are often inadequately paid by the government.
Since the interests of the businessmen are not likely to always coincide with the
provisions of the rules and regulations, the decisions made by bureaucrats are likely to
conflict with what the businessmen want. Then businessmen will find it most efficient
and practical to corrupt the officials to his way. In this environment corruption may
persist (Lewis 1951).
Faced with this kind of problem, the government has three possible policies
Morgan (1964): (1) “do nothing.” Ignore the problem, hoping that the public would not
notice the extent of the problem. In the pursuit of playing down the problem, the
government may try to limit the freedom of press; (2) “hang scapegoats.” Government
can pretend that it is doing something about the corruption. One can find examples of
high profile corruption prosecutions that are allegedly selective; (3) “moderate the rules.”
Rules are violated because they differ from what people want to do. Countries with free
press and independent judiciary are constantly engaged in updating the rules in the
direction of public notion of reasonableness. Morgan says open and democratic regimes
tend to follow the third policy, while dictatorial regimes follow the first two policies. As
long as there are rules, regulations, and laws there likely to be pressure to become
corrupt.
It is rather hard to find a country with no laws and rules. Even the primitive
societies establish certain rules and customs. Then what makes some of the countries
more prone to corruption? First, the existence of economic rents, such as large military
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spending and natural resource revenues can contribute to the problem of corruption if the
government system is non-transparent (Gupta et al. 2000; Leite and Weidmann 1999). In
many of the less developed countries, foreign aid does not reach the target because the
officials in charge of distributing and handling the aid money have incentive to steal.
Foreign aid does not reduce corruption; in fact aid often goes to more corrupt countries.
Aid dependence erodes the quality of governance (Alesina and Weder 2002; Knack
2001). Both of these studies establish a negative robust relationship between various
measures of corruption and foreign aid. Moreover, Alesina and Weder (2002) find that
while Scandinavian and Australian aid goes to countries with lower corruption, the U.S.
favors democracies. That suggests that unless the anti-corruption efforts are on priority
list of donors, foreign aid might contribute to corruption in recipient governments.
Many of the countries cannot afford to pay well their civil servants. For example,
in transition economies it is not unusual when salaries are not paid for months and the
civil service salaries are barely enough for adequate living. Underpaid civil servants are
more prone to become corrupt (van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). Van Rijckeghem and
Weder find that countries with higher civil service salaries relative to those in
manufacturing sector tend to have lower levels of bureaucratic corruption. That supports
the argument that civil servants with low wages often have supplement their income with
bribes or other legal and illegal sources income to sustain an adequate living for
themselves (Morgan 1964).
Countries cannot pay adequate civil service wages mostly because of economic
constraints. Then economic instability or transition could generate fertile ground for
corruption. For example, countries in transition such as Russia find itself in increasing
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corruption after the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent economic crises. Braun and
Di Tella (2004) argue that inflation variability can lead to higher corruption and lower
investment. They find that one standard deviation increase in inflation variance from the
median increases corruption by 12 percent of a standard deviation and reduces economic
growth by 0.33 percentage points. Along the similar lines, the market structure seems to
be important. Conventional wisdom is that competition may be a way to reduce the
returns from corruption. But there are recent arguments that an increase in competition
may not lower corruption, rather corruption affects the number of firms in free-entry
equilibrium (Bliss and Di Tella 1997). In other words, corrupt officials extract money
from firms and lower the returns from investment, which forces some firms to exit.
Celentani and Ganuza (2002) analyze the relationship between competition and
corruption in procurement markets, and show that cost of tougher competition may be
higher corruption. In other words, faced with limited supply of government contracts the
firms are under pressure to do everything possible to get ahead of the line, including
bribery. But things change a bit when economy is open. More open economies are likely
to make efforts to improve the governance and have lower corruption (Wei 2000a). Wei
estimates the “natural openness” by regressing export and import share of GDP on the
population size, and demographic and geographic characteristics. Using his estimated
“natural openness” measure, he finds that “naturally open” economies tend to exhibit less
corruption. Moreover, “naturally open” countries tend to pay higher civil servant wages
relative to those in private sector.
However, even when wages are low some people preserve their integrity under all
circumstances and behave in a manner consistent with civil service standards. That
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implies that there are some factors, other than monetary, that influence peoples’ decision
to engage in corrupt activities. There is a literature on social norms and how they tend to
play a large role shaping individual’s attitude towards corruption; individual opposes less
to corruption if others are corrupt (Gatti et al. 2003; Mauro 2004). Fight against
corruption may start with educating the children and teaching them the values of clean
society. In his 2004 address to the nation, the president of India Abdul Kalam6 said
“…there are only three members of the society, who can remove corruption… They are
father, mother and elementary school teacher.” The implication is that the morals of
people have to be changed for corruption to go away. Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) show
that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption in a framework
of an overlapping generation model with transmission of values. They assume that agents
can either be corrupt or honest and newborn agents form their preferences according to
parents’ effort to educate them and the general corruption level in the society. Principles
can leave the high corruption state by promising a better future for the children. For their
children’s sake parents exert higher education effort thus increasing the proportion of
moral agents. According to them, educating the young ones is the most effective tool in
fighting corruption. Then lack of morals could be one of the reasons for persistence of
corruption, but certainly cannot be the only one. Even the honest individuals can be
consumed by the corrupting system over time as the cost of being corrupt outweighs the
cost of being honest.
There are number of studies that stress the significance of political system and
institutional design. Empirical evidence by Lederman et al. (2004) suggests that political
institutions are important in determining the prevalence of corruption. Countries with
6
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stable, democratic, or parliamentary governments and the countries with free press are
likely to have lower corruption. Openness, legal traditions are not significant
determinants of corruption once controlled for political institutions. Charap and Harm
(1999) argue that corruption patterns are endogenous to political system. Competitive
corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators
implement a system of monopolistic corruption. Dictatorships should be more centralized
than democracies (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina and Weder 2002). Ades and
Glaeser (1995) find that countries with history of dictatorial regimes have capital cities
that are much larger, relative to the size of the nation, than in democratic countries. Poor
infrastructure that increases the cost of internal trade, and high tariffs that lower the
degree of openness contribute to concentration of population in urban areas. More
importantly, concentration of power in central government at capital city leads to growth
of large capital city. That leads to concentration of wealth which attracts migrants to the
capital city. Persson et al. (2001) find that larger voting districts – and thus lower barriers
to entry - are associated with corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from
party lists – and thus less individual accountability – are associated with more corruption.
Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over
party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust.
Besides macroeconomic, institutional and cultural determinants of corruption, there are
some identified microeconomic factors as well. Clarke and Xu (2004) find that profitable,
newer enterprises and the ones with higher overdue utility payments are likely to pay
bribes. On the other hand, countries with state-owned or less competitive utility sector
tend to have higher bribe levels. For example, Finland and Laos have about the same
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number of people. Finland has a telephone density of 55 mainlines per 100 people, while
Laos has a density of less than one mainline per 100 people. It is clear that there is a
shortage in telephone lines in Laos. It would be not surprising if people offered bribes to
get ahead of the line for telephone installation, if you take into account the fact that the
waiting list for telephone line is zero in Finland, while it is almost six thousand people in
Laos.
There are some findings that suggest countries with more representation of women in
parliament tend to have lower levels of corruption, and corruption is less severe where
women comprise a larger share of labor force (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001).
These two studies provide some evidence that increasing women’s representation might
reduce corruption in an organization and its environment. It can, of course, be the case
that less corrupt and more democratic countries employ more women and provide more
opportunities to women. But the relationship between gender and corruption is an
interesting issue that hasn’t been explored well. It is possible that women are indeed less
prone to corruption as shown by Schultze and Frank (2000). In an experimental setting,
they find that women behave no differently than men in the non-risk treatment, but that
they are significantly less corruptible in risky (real world) situations indicating a higher
degree of risk aversion.
In his recent study, Mauro (2004) shows relationship between political instability,
economic growth, and corruption. Intuitively his model argues that if an official is
corrupt and collects bribes from firms, then corruption reduces entrepreneurs’ incentives
to invest which in turn slows down economic growth. Citizens may penalize corrupt
government for slow economic growth by not reelecting. The problem is that citizens
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may not know who exactly is corrupt, thus decide not to reelect the whole government.
This shortens the career of uncorrupt official, thus making him more inclined to extract
all the rents he can while in office. In other words, when corruption is widespread,
individuals do not have incentives to fight corruption even if everybody is better off
without it. Cabelkova and Hanousek (2004) find that when people perceive that
corruption widespread, they are likely to be more willing to offer bribes. Similarly,
corrupt politicians can produce more corrupt politicians. Casellia and Morelli (2004)
argue that individuals with lower competence seek public office and countries may find
themselves in short supply of more competent individuals in government because so do
other competent individuals. As a result less competent incumbents may take larger share
of public offices and by corrupting the system may make it incentive incompatible for
more competent individuals to seek public office.

How to Fight Corruption
There have been a variety of suggestions on how to fight corruption. The most common
ones suggest some combinations of “sticks” and “carrots.” Some suggest that public
servant wages be raised, hoping that well paid civil servants would resists the temptation
of bribes. However, van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) have shown that wages have to
be increased significantly before they have any effect on corruption. In other words,
although corruption may potentially be mitigated by raising civil servant wages, the costs
may outweigh the benefits. Increasing public sector wages places heavy burden on
budgets (Besley and McLaren 1993). Most of the countries with high corruption are the
ones who are struggling with budget deficits. For example, budget deficits for
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Madagascar and Paraguay were 2.7 and 3.3 percent of their respective GDPs in 1999
(World Bank 2004). Yet the central government in Paraguay was spending 43.1 percent
of their expenditures on wages that same year.
Others suggest that bonuses be offered to those who uncover corrupt activities (Chand
and Moene 1999; Polinsky and Shavell 2001). Chand and Moene (1999) suggest that
fiscal corruption may be mitigated through provision of incentives such as bonuses to
fiscal officers based on how much taxes they collect. One of the finding of the analysis is
that the distributional effects of tax evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive
under the kinds of schemes usual in practice. Collecting taxes without inducing evasion
or corruption may require that tax inspectors be paid commission on high income reports.
However, offering bonuses may not always be effective in fight against corruption. For
example, Polinsky and Shavell (2001) analyze corruption in law enforcement in the form
of bribes to officers, threats to frame innocent individuals in order to extort money from
them, and the actual framing. They argue that the state may combat corruption by paying
rewards to enforcement agents for reporting violations. Though reducing bribery, it may
encourage framing. Thus rewards should be balanced so that it reduces both bribes and
framing. Overall, the success of these methods are conditional on higher level of
governments being corruption free or governments not framing innocent individuals in
pursuit of bonuses.
The theoretical model by Choi and Thum (2004) suggests that ex post incentive of
corrupt officials’ to increase the bribe demanded induces delay in entry decisions of
entrepreneurs. The intuition is that government starts to ask for increased bribes after
firms start investing substantial amounts of money on physical capital, which makes exit
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very unattractive solution. They suggest that job rotation might reduce officials’ ability to
price discriminate thus could help mitigate corruption. If officials are frequently
reassigned to different regions or sectors, the likelihood of officials asking for increased
bribes would decrease because they’ll be faced with new entrepreneurs each time.
Brunetti and Weder (2003) provide empirical evidence that higher freedom of press leads
to lower corruption in a cross country study, and causation runs from more press freedom
to less corruption. Press freedom is measured by the index from Freedom House, which
has compiled indices of press freedom based on expert opinions, findings of international
human rights groups and press organizations, analysis of publications and news services
and reports of governments on related subjects. Corruption is measured by corruption
index from International Country Risk Guide. Instrumental variable and panel data
analysis show that press freedom is an important check on corruption. Economically the
relationship is significant too. If Indonesia were to free their press to the level of Norway,
then the corruption would be reduced to the level of Singapore.
Despite numerous suggestions for fighting corruption, no one seems to have found a
definite method to combat corruption. Jain (2001) stresses the importance of economic
rents associated with investments and the strengths of political institutions in combating
corruption. The question raised in this dissertation is whether a change in government
structure to a more decentralized form can reduce the opportunities for corruption or
change the incentive structure of the corrupt officials.
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Fiscal Decentralization
In recent years more and more countries are pursuing decentralization policies.
The World Bank reports that some 95 percent of democracies have elected subnational
governments, and more and more countries are devolving political, fiscal, and
administrative powers to subnational governments (World Bank 2000). Political reality
often compel the governments to adopt decentralization strategy (Bird 1993).
Governments in many developing and transition countries hope that decentralization will
give answers to their fiscal and political problems as well as improving the service
delivery etc.
But what is decentralization? It is hard to give a straightforward definition.
Decentralization literature provides distinctions among deconcentration, delegation, and
devolution (Litvack et al. 1998; Rondinelli 1981). Deconcentration is dispersion of
certain central government responsibilities to regional offices of the central government.
This is not real decentralization because there is no transfer of authority from the central
government to subnational governments. Next, delegation is a process where the central
government transfers responsibility fro decision-making and administration of functions
to subnational governments. But subnational governments are held accountable to the
central government. Although the subnational governments have some discretion, they
still have to act according to the central government wishes. Lastly, devolution happens
when central government transfers authority for decision-making and finance to
subnational governments. Under devolution, local governments elect their leaders and
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raise their own revenue to finance the expenditure needs they identify. We are interested
in devolution in our analysis.
Depending on what functions are devolved, the decentralization can be called
fiscal, administrative, and political. If authority to raise revenues and spend are devolved
we would observed a fiscal decentralization. In this thesis we are mainly interested in
analyzing the effect of fiscal decentralization on bribery.
Some countries are more decentralized than others. There is a wide range of
reasons why it is so. Legal traditions, constitutional system, and economic background
are all important factors in decentralization. First, decentralization is strongly influenced
by a legal tradition. For example, common law system is not based on hierarchy of
norms.7 This may partly explain why English unitary state could integrate much more
decentralization than the French one. English local authorities are not merely local agents
of the central power like in original French system, but have competence to discharge
their own functions in their own right (La Porta et al. 2003).
Second, if central governments are given the most important central powers it is
likely to pursue centralization. By definition, the central governments in unitary states are
given the centralized power. Then, the unitary systems are likely to have central
governments unwilling to give up their power. On the other hand, if there is legislature
composed of the representatives of local authorities, then the opposite is true.
Third, countries push more responsibility towards their subnational units as their
income rises. Even the unitary and traditionally centralized government find themselves

7

Common law is the body of customary law, based upon judicial decisions and embodied in reports of
decided cases, which has been administered by the common-law courts of England since the Middle Ages.
From this has evolved the type of legal system now found also in the United States and in most of the
member states of the Commonwealth of Nations (Encyclopedia Britannica)
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in a need to delegate and devolve many of the government functions. In many cases the
government may create new responsibilities as the nature of the economy changes. Many
of those tasks may be more suitable to be handled by the local governments. Bahl and
Linn (1992) argue that as countries advance economically the gains from fiscal
decentralization emerge.

Advantages of Fiscal Decentralization
Decentralization by itself does not provide solutions to problems. For
decentralization to occur local authorities must have a decision-making competence. In
other words, decentralization can work only when substantial tasks and powers are
transferred with staff and financial means to match (Bahl 1999a). Also, decentralization
is a complex process that should be implemented in a right way to have any benefits
(Bahl 1999b).
What are the advantages of decentralization if the process is carried out properly?
The advocates of decentralization argue that decentralizing the delivery of local public
goods without substantial interjurisdictional spillovers improves the efficiency and
responsiveness of the public sector in at least four ways--by promoting allocative
efficiency (Breton 1996; Hayek 1945; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1968; Qian and Weingast
1997; Tiebout 1956), by fostering productive efficiency (Ostrom et al. 1993), by
facilitating cost recovery (Briscoe and Garn 1995; Litvack and Seddon 1999), and by
securing national unity (Litvack et al. 1998).
The first argument, promotion of allocative efficiency, is the most common one. It
is said to promote allocative efficiency by allowing greater differentiation of resource
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allocations across jurisdictions according to the demand in each locality. Subnational
governments are argued to be in a better position than the central government to insure
that services delivered match the preferences and circumstances in the jurisdiction. There
are two main reasons why it is the case. First, subnational governments are closer to
people than the central government, thus they are considered to have better information
than the central government about the preferences of the local populations (Hayek 1945;
Musgrave 1959). Second, subnational governments are thought to be more responsive
than central governments to variations in demand for public goods. In this view,
decentralization increases the likelihood that governments respond to the demands of
local population by promoting competition among subnational governments (Tiebout
1956). Competition allows for a variety of bundles of local public goods to be produced,
and individuals reveal their preferences by “voting with their feet.” This
interjurisdictional competition is seen to pressure subnational governments to pay
attention to the preferences of their constituents and tailor the service delivery
accordingly whilst risking the loss of tax revenue (Oates 1968; Qian and Weingast 1997).
But, vertical competition between the national subnational governments might make
intergovernmental competition beneficial (Breton 1996).
Next, a political rationale for decentralization is that good governments are those
closer to the people (World Bank 1997). Ostrom et al. (1993) argue that citizens tend to
be more aware of subnational governments’ actions than they are of actions of the central
government. The mobility of labor can impose discipline on subnational governments,
and more effective incentive schemes can be designed if local officials are responsible for
local outcomes. Similarly, Gordon and Wilson (2001) argue that competition for
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residents forces officials to reduce the waste of public resources and increase the public
expenditure. If financing of public services is devolved via the assignment of tax
instruments or the collection of user fees, incentives for effective governance arise
according to the logic of “market preserving federalism.” Clear institutional
arrangements, budget constraints, and revenue expectations drive local government to
maximize cost-efficiency and constituent service (Qian and Weingast 1997).
Third, making services more demand-responsive through decentralization is
thought to have the added benefit of increasing households’ willingness to pay for
services (Briscoe and Garn 1995; Litvack and Seddon 1999). Households are more
willing to pay for the services that meet their demands. People are likely to be willing to
pay taxes knowing that their local tax money would go into building a neighborhood
park. If local governments have greater control over how revenues are used they may
exert greater fiscal effort to raise tax revenues. Also, the tighter the circuit of public
service finance and delivery, given a more transparent system, the more obvious the
systematic corruption becomes to subnational governments and communities. This
strengthens the incentives of subnational governments and their constituents to monitor
revenue collection, planning, expenditure, and service delivery. This in turn helps
increase willingness to pay both taxes and fees.
Lastly, a quite different political rationale for decentralization is to accommodate
pressure for regional autonomy, and increase legitimacy and sustainability of
heterogeneous national states (Litvack et al. 1998). Especially large countries such as the
Russian Federation, China and Canada with one or more regions with different ethnic
groups find themselves in a need to give some level of autonomy to regions to avoid
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separatist movements. In smaller countries such as South Africa, Uganda, Sri Lanka,
Ethiopia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Colombia decentralization has served as a path to
national unity. After the abolishment of apartheid, the racial jurisdictions were formally
abolished and the country was subdivided into racially mixed provinces and
municipalities with democratically elected governments. Instead of falling apart into
separate white and black countries, South Africa kept its national unity thanks to
decentralization policies. In Uganda, giving power to the people of villages to choose
their leaders helped to subdue the hostilities between fractions after the civil war (World
Bank 2000). Despite the challenges the decentralization policies help to preserve the
national unity in countries with diverse ethnic, religious, or racial groups.

Corruption and Decentralization
Decentralization has a significant impact on the economy and the society as
evidenced by its relationship with variety of issues.8 Recently there is an increasing
interest in the possible relationship between corruption and decentralization. Besley and
Coate (1999) have shown that in a world of benevolent governments, the disadvantages
of centralization stressed in the literature, except the informational advantages regarding
the preferences of local voters and citizens, disappear, suggesting that the case for
decentralization must be mostly driven by political economy considerations. Lockwood
(2002) argues that the cost of centralization is not policy uniformity, but inefficient
8

Various studies have tried to link decentralization to economic growth (Davoodi and Zou 1999; Woller
and Philips 1998; Xie et al. 1999; Zhang and Zou 1998), social capital (de Mello 2004), quality of public
services (Khaleghian 2004), macroeconomic management (Ter-Minassian 1997), accountability (Khemani
2001), government size (Ehdaie 1994; Stein 1999), and regional disparities (Canaleta et al. 2004; Habibi et
al. 2001; West and Wong 1995)
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choice of projects due to cost-sharing and lack of responsiveness of the legislative
process to benefits. Decentralization might be justified by increased accountability and
responsiveness of government. Increased accountability and transparency are the keys to
a successful economic approach against corruption (Jain 2001; Martinez-Vazquez and
McNab 2003; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). These seem to be the
attributes of successful decentralization. The question is whether decentralization is
associated with less corruption.
A wide variety of models have been developed in an attempt to answer the
question of whether decentralization is likely to reduce the potential for corruption or
increase opportunities for it. The models provide mixed theoretical support, and the
empirical evidence on the relationship between corruption and decentralization is also
mixed. The differences in theoretical predictions can be partly explained by the fact that
the corruption and decentralization are defined differently in many of the models, and
assumptions, regarding the mobility of residents, preferences of the officials etc., vary
greatly. Therefore, it is not surprising that the predictions and implications of the
theoretical models differ widely. For example, some models assume the central
government to be honest, while others do not. Let us review the existing literature on the
relationship between corruption and decentralization.
Under decentralization local governments are held directly accountable for their
actions, while under a centralized system the government cares only about aggregate
performance, i.e., inflation, economic growth etc. (Tabellini 2000). Besides, citizens are
likely to be more vigilant and governments are more accountable at the local level. Based
on data on India, Khemani (2001) finds the evidence that supports this argument. She
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finds that in state assembly elections, voters reward incumbents for local income growth,
and punish them for growth in inequality, over the entire term in office. However, in
national elections voters behave shortsightedly by rewarding growth in national income
and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year just before elections. Based on
analysis of the decentralization of power as a problem in the allocation of control rights
under incomplete contracts, Seabright (1996) argues that decentralization may be
valuable in improving accountability of governments to their citizens even without
differences in preferences between localities. Despite the benefits of policy coordination,
centralization has the cost of diminished accountability, “which can be precisely defined
as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re-election
of the government.”
Decentralization can create incentives for regional governments to foster
economic growth (Jin et al. 2000). They credit the market-preserving federalism for the
economic growth in China. They argue that given the proper incentive the local
governments in China acted in a way that supported the economic activities in their
localities during 1979-1993. By shifting power to local governments, the Chinese were
able to avoid the interventions by the central government that would have compromised
the reforms. Wei (2000b) argues that country-wide anti-corruption reforms are less
effective because there are number of disadvantages such as political risk, budgetary
constraint, and local suitability of the reforms. He argues that if the reforms fail to
produce results soon enough the high level politicians face risk of being voted out the
office. Raising wages of the civil servants create pressure on budgets that are already
constrained in the presence of corruption. Lastly, one size does not fit all. Differences in
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local traditions, history, and institutions make it difficult to design a single anticorruption reform. Wei (2000b) proposes to start reforms from a single locality and go
upwards. That way the above mentioned risks are reduced. For example, reform in one
locality is going to be much less costly than national reform, and failure in one place is
not likely to affect the outcome of the elections thus reducing the political risks for the
politicians. In other words, decentralized anti-corruption reform is likely to be more
effective and easier to start.
How about the relationship between petty corruption and decentralization?
Bureaucrats often have monopoly in providing certain services to the public. Normally,
citizens are not mobile. Voting with one’s feet is not an option most of the time. This
creates a temptation for bureaucrats to ask for bribes from the public for the services they
provide. Bureaucratic competition is sometimes proposed as a way to reduce that kind of
corruption. In case of limited mobility, official discretion might be reduced if clients are
allowed to obtain services from any of several independent bureaucrats responsible for
the provision of the same services (Sanyal 2004; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). For
example, residents in the United States can choose which Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) office to go to obtain their driver’s licenses. That reduces the monopolistic power
of the bureaucrats issuing licenses. If a clerk at DMV office asks for a bribe, citizens are
less likely to comply, since they can always choose to go the next office a few miles
away.
Carbonara (1999) studies the effect of decentralization on corruption in a
hierarchical organization, where decentralization is defined as the delegation of control
power to lower levels. Under a decentralized system, the agents at lower levels have more
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discretion and are freer to engage in corruption, without having to worry too much about
being overruled by superiors. However, this does not mean that decentralization leads to
more corruption. With decentralization superiors might have a higher incentive to
monitor. If the superior layers in charge of detecting and punishing corruption are corrupt
themselves, decentralization actually increases corruption. If the manager benefits more
from uncovering more bribery cases, then decentralization can improve her incentives to
monitor corrupt agents, thus increasing the probability that the agents are caught and it is
possible that decentralization helps in controlling corruption.
In some countries, especially the large ones, the central government may have
challenges in its attempt to control the budgets of subnational governments. In some
cases, it may make sense to decentralize (Litwack 2002). Litwack argues that in the
presence of corruption and informal autonomy, central government’s efforts to control
subnational budgets might be counterproductive and lead to higher overall tax burden
and, consequently, lower output. He argues that subnational governments set aside some
part of the formal budget in an informal budget for their private use. Subsequently, the
subnational public expenditures are suboptimally low. When the central government
mandates certain expenditures without additional funding, the subnational government
raises taxes instead of reducing their informal budgets. This creates distortions in the
system in the form of higher taxes and leads to lower output. He argues that unless the
central government starts a major reform and imposes high costs on subnational
governments for corrupt activities, the attempts to control the subnational budgets are
likely to do more harm than good. Yet the central government has to be careful in
decentralizing the authorities. Unless the central government is strong, devolution of
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power may result in local governments competing with each other by shielding firms
from central tax collectors or regulators (Cai and Treisman 2004).
Greater cohesiveness of interest groups and higher levels of voter ignorance at the
local level would make capture at the local level more likely if you ignore the other
factors that contribute to local capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000). The other factors
are the relative extent of electoral competition, electoral uncertainty, and heterogeneity
among local districts with respect to intra-district inequality. For example, lack of
electoral competition would result from a loyalty bias to one particular party, and the
existence of a large number of swing voters contributes to electoral uncertainty. Thus, the
extent of local capture may be context and case specific. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2001)
provide an analytical framework to evaluate the resulting trade-offs and to predict the
effects of decentralization on the volume and allocation of service delivery under
different financing mechanisms. They find that greater fiscal autonomy of local
governments expands the volume of service delivery, but this tends to be accompanied by
service overprovision to local elites at the expense of the non-elites.
The economically optimal amount of corruption might not be zero (Waller et al.
2002). Using a hierarchical model of government, they study whether centralizing
corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount
of corruption. They define corruption two ways: bribe per investment project and total
bribe payments in the economy. Depending on the definition the predictions of the model
differ. Adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. They argue
that if corruption is measured by the amount of bribes per investment project, then
centralizing corruption at the top of the government may lead to a more efficient

39
allocation of corruption. By more efficient, they mean less bribe per investment that leads
to more investment in the formal sector.
However, the above model assumes a single autocrat, for example a governor in a
corrupt region, or a corrupt municipality. We ask the question in a bit different way.
What happens if there is more than one autocrat? Horizontal competition between
governments to attract residents is not strong if mobility of residents is limited
(Brueckner 2000). If that is the case, we argue that competition between central and
subnational government is particularly important. Also, because of its constitutionally
defined unique nature, the central government is not subject to competition. The only
way to subject the central government is through vertical competition. By decentralizing
the government functions, thus creating strong subnational governments, it is possible to
create vertical competition that could act as constraint on actions of corrupt government
officials.
The empirical literature has not tested all the above theoretical hypotheses, mostly
due to lack of adequate data, and the existing ones offer mixed results. Fisman and Gatti
(2002a) find that fiscal decentralization in government expenditure is strongly and
significantly associated with lower corruption across the sample of 55 countries
controlling for the degree of civil liberty, country size (GDP and population), share of
government expenditure in GDP, openness, ethnic fractionalization, index of contract
enforceability, and dummy variable for countries with federal constitution. Their measure
of corruption is the corruption index by International Country Risk Guide. This index is
based on assessment of political risk faced by foreign private investors due to corruption
of government in host countries. It is probably the most commonly used measure of
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corruption in empirical studies. They measure decentralization by subnational share of
total government spending averaged over the period 1980-1995. The data are from the
International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics. Robustness check is done
using other corruption indices such World Competitiveness Report and German Export
Index.
Gurgur and Shah (2005) find that decentralization has a negative impact on
corruption, where decentralization is measured as a ratio of employment in non-central
government administration to general civilian government employment, and corruption is
measured by the corruption perception index from Transparency International. They
divide countries into two groups, unitary and federal. They divide the sample of 30
countries into two groups and do weighted least squares estimation. Based on the
coefficients of decentralization in each group, they conclude that decentralization in
unitary states has a greater impact on corruption. The control variables are government
size, complexity of tax system, openness, competitiveness of market structure, laxity of
bureaucratic control, judicial fairness, democratic institutions, colonial past, lack of
service orientation in bureaucratic culture, ethnic heterogeneity, government pay, and
social development.
Treisman (2000) on the other hand finds that federal countries have higher
perceived corruption. He uses a simple dummy variable for federal countries. A country
is defined federal if it has a subnational government with constitutional defined
autonomy. A federal country dummy variable might not reflect the degree of
decentralization. Decentralization and federalism are not exactly the same things.
According to Rubin (2001), “federalism is a principle of political organization in which a
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single polity, or nation, has both a central government and separate, geographically
defined governments that are subordinate to the central government in certain matters but
independent of it in others.” In contrast, decentralization is “a decision by the central
government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined,
to exercise authority in certain areas. It differs from federalism in that the subunits that
have been authorized to act do not possess any claim against the central government.”
There is an evidence that the 1994 decentralization in Bolivia led to positive
changes in public investment patterns in human capital and social services as poorest
regions chose projects according to their greatest needs (Faguet 2004). The study
measures the decentralization by dummy variable that takes the value of zero before 1994
and one after 1994. The test was conducted to analyze how the public investment has
changed with decentralization and if need indicators were the determinants of that
change. The results of the study contradict the claim that local governments are
incompetent, corrupt and prone to capture by interest groups. The implication of this
result is that local governments do better job of sensing the local needs compared with
the central government.
Based on the existing empirical literature one can observe that specific aspects of
decentralization have not been tested against corruption. Decentralization is a
multifaceted concept that needs a careful analysis. In addition to the subnational share of
government spending and the subnational share of government employment, the
subnational share of revenues, autonomy enjoyed by the subnational, fiscal accountability
of local governments, and number of local jurisdictions are all important aspects of
decentralization. Cross country analysis is often hampered by a lack of comparative data.
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There is hope for relatively reliable dataset for selected OECD member countries (Ebel
and Yilmaz 2002). However, as of today the dataset is limited in its coverage. Once the
coverage is extended the dataset could provide addition insights into the revenue
autonomy aspects of decentralization process and its implications for corruption.
Almost all the studies employ the corruption perception index as their measure of
corruption. The secretive nature of the corruption process and the incentive
incompatibility of the parties engaged in corruption to reveal their actions hamper the
measurement of true extent of corruption. One alternative is to use the data on actual
prosecution of corruption cases and corruption victimization survey data. Data on
prosecution is not flawless as we will discuss later. Victimization survey data are more
reliable and draw a truer picture of actual corruption. The use of alternative measures of
actual corruption for cross country analysis would be a contribution to the empirical
literature.

CHAPTER III. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
A wide variety of models have been developed in an attempt to address the issue
of corruption. An interesting way to approach the problem is to model the government as
a maximizer of bribe revenues. Waller et al. (2002) argue that socially optimal level of
corruption is not zero and that centralized bribe collection is less harmful than
decentralized bribe taking. They assume that there are three players in the economy:
entrepreneurs, who are required to obtain business licenses from numerous bureaucrats;
bureaucrats, who charge bribes for issuing the licenses; and the autocrat, who gets the
share of bribe revenue. According to their hierarchal model of government, centralized
corruption lets the autocrat coordinate the bribe collection thus leading to lower bribe per
investment project. On the other hand, decentralized corruption makes the autocrat just
another bribe collector in addition to uncoordinated local bureaucrats setting their own
bribes, thus leading to higher bribes in aggregate. This is also consistent with Shleifer and
Vishny (1993), who argue that cost of corruption is higher when different government
agencies and bureaucrats impose independent bribes on private agents seeking
complementary permits from these agencies.
This model is suitable to describe corruption in a single, small jurisdiction, for
example a city where the autocrat is the corrupt mayor and the bureaucrats are the various
inspectors who are collecting bribes for him. Indeed if the city government cannot control
its corrupt bureaucrats the total corruption is likely to be high as the model predicts.
However, this model does not take into account the possibility of competition between
two or more autocrats. Various forms of competition between autocrats are possible. For
example, vertical competition between central and local governments, and horizontal
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competition between corrupt officials in neighboring cities, counties, or regions etc.
Separation of powers and federalism create rivalries between different players in the
government. That creates incentives to prosecute corruption. Moreover, if internal
monitoring works well, corruption is unlikely to appear in first place (Glaeser and Goldin
2004).
In our research we will examine bribery and the effect of decentralization on
corruption when there is a competition between the central and subnational governments.
There are two fundamental reasons for emphasizing vertical competition (Knutsen 1992).
First, vertical competition is the only way to subject the central government to
competition, because of the constitutionally defined unique nature of the central
government. Second, vertical competition is particularly important when there is limited
physical mobility of the citizens. The merits of horizontal competition only materialize if
capital or labor is mobile. That is why vertical competition is a very important
complement to horizontal competition.
We believe our research contributes to the literature by identifying a channel
through which decentralization might influence corruption, namely a vertical competition
between the levels of government given a clear division of expenditure responsibilities.
We develop a theoretical model of a bribe revenue maximizing corrupt government, and
examine how the change in government system, i.e., from centralized to decentralized
one, changes the bribes they collect.
Greater decentralization leads to interjurisdictional competition between local
governments to attract residents (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Tiebout 1956). The
literature provides a vast number of studies on tax competition. Traditionally, the tax
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competition literature has emphasized the wasteful competition among governments for
scarce capital through reduction in tax rates and public expenditures levels. More
recently, the efficiency enhancing roles of competition have started to draw attention of
the researchers (Wilson 1999). Vertical tax competition is a relatively less studied
concept (Keen 1998). Vertical competition between corrupt officials is virtually an
untouched subject. It is also very important subject because there is a need to challenge
the monopolistic status of the central government officials. When asked what were the
factors that contribute to an increase in corruption, people thought that the immunity of
high level officials was one of the top three reasons. The other two were public tolerance
of corruption, and deterioration of the rule of law (Transparency International 2002).
For the theoretical part we adopt a framework developed by (Choi and Thum
2002, 2004). They analyze how the option of entrepreneur to flee into the underground
economy affects the corruption in the government. We change the settings of the model
and introduce two levels of government and make the following assumptions:
1. There are two levels of government. There is a clear division of responsibilities.
Officials at each level make decisions regarding the economic activities. We ignore the
numerous bureaucrats who work for the official, assuming that the official has a full
control over them.
2. There is a population of entrepreneurs whose total number is normalized to
unity. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their ability to generate income. Let v denote
an entrepreneur’s net earnings reflecting his ability. In other words, the earnings are net
of costs and taxes. The distribution of abilities is given by the inverse cumulative
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distribution function F(v) with continuous density F’(v)≤0 that is F(v) denotes the
proportion of entrepreneurs who can generate income more than v.
3. Entrepreneurs are required to make an under-the-table payment in the amount
of b to a corrupt government official in order to influence the decision of government in
government procurement. Let us call b bribes. Various interpretations of b are possible,
such as b is a kickback for awarding a government contract, or b is a bribe for getting a
business registered, or b is a bribe for connecting to the public utilities. For example,
when electricity has to be rationed with rolling blackout, some businesses may bribe
public utilities to supply electricity without interruption. When there is a shortage of
telephone lines, businesses often have to bribe officials in charge of distributing
telephone lines.
The official sets the level of b to maximize his personal revenues. As the
entrepreneur’s earnings v is private information, the corrupt official cannot price
discriminate and charges a uniform bribe b. From the entrepreneur’s point of view, this
payment b is an additional cost of conducting a business.

Corruption with Centralization
As a benchmark, we first consider a complete centralization of government. We
assume that all the functions of the government are centralized, and the entrepreneurs are
required to deal with the central government. Local government exists but under
complete centralization it does not have any spending authority and acts as an agent of
the central government. Let us assume that the central government collects bribe b from
entrepreneurs for doing business in the official sector. By operating in the official sector,
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firm must interact with government. Taxation, public infrastructure or government
regulations all force private and government sector to interact. But, our model is mainly
focused on the interaction between the two on expenditure side of the budget. Faced with
a corrupt official, an entrepreneur can only choose to enter the market or not. To enter the
market he has to pay b to the government official. Only the entrepreneurs who can
generate non-negative incomes enter the market and make payment b to the corrupt
official: v – b ≥ 0. Given that officials ask firms to pay bribes b, the marginal type who is
indifferent between entry and exit is given by v = b.
The corrupt official maximizes his revenue:

max[ w + bF (b)]
b

where b is the bribe collected from each entrepreneur, and F(b) is the number of
the entrepreneurs in the economy. bF(b) is the total fees collected by the government
official. In addition to the bribe revenue the official receives fixed wages w.
The marginal entrant b* that maximizes the corrupt official’s revenue is implicitly
given by the first order condition:
F(b*)+b*F’(b*)=0

(1)

Following Choi and Thum (2004), we make the standard assumption that the
distribution of types satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, that is, -F(b)’/F(b) is
increasing,

∂ ⎡ F ' (b) ⎤
⎢−
⎥>0
∂v ⎣ F (b) ⎦

-F(b)’’F(b)+[F(b)’]2>0

(2)

This assumption ensures that the second order condition for the maximization
problem is satisfied:
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2F’(b)+bF’’(b)<0

(3)

Using the first order condition, b = −

F (b)
, the second order condition is
F ' (b)

rewritten as

2 F ' (b) −

F (b) ''
F (b) < 0
F ' (b)

From (2) we can derive F ' (b) >

(4)

F (b) ''
F (b) and substitute into (4). Thus we can
F ' (b)

show that (4) is less than zero. Then the number of entrants is given by F(b*). The official
asks a uniform bribe b* from everyone (Choi and Thum 2002, 2004).

Corruption with Decentralization
Now we assume that the government is decentralized, so that entrepreneurs can
do business in either central or local jurisdiction and the central government cannot
directly control the actions of the local government officials. In other words, some of the
spending authority is transferred to local governments, who make their own decisions.
Let us assume that local government does not ask for bribes and the entrepreneurs can
choose to operate in local jurisdiction to avoid paying bribe. However, local projects are
likely to be less attractive than the ones administered by the central government. Local
government expenditures are likely to be in primary and secondary education, basic
health care, public libraries etc. Expenditures on these areas are likely to be smaller than
the central government spending on military or major construction of highways. We can
account for the decrease in value of the project by the coefficient p. In other words, by
choosing to enter in business in local jurisdiction, a firm with have an earning capacity
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pv. Other interpretations are possible. The central government may intervene in local
government affairs and impose additional costs on entrepreneur, or the local jurisdiction
does not have attractive business opportunities etc. The profit of a risk-neutral
entrepreneur in local jurisdiction is then given by (1-p)v. Later on we will relax the
assumption of corruption-free local government. For now we assume that only the central
government asks firms to pay bribe.
As long as there is some profit can be made firms will enter the economy and
operate in the jurisdiction of the local government,
0 ≤ v*
where v*=b* is defined by (1).
When entrepreneurs make their entry decisions, they choose the level of
government that yields the highest expected profit. For a given bribe b asked by the
government, the entrepreneur faces the following entry configuration: (1) if

b
p

≤v ,

then deal with the central government, in other words, entrepreneur will deal with the
central government as long as whatever he pays in bribes is less than the expected
earnings; (2) deal with the local government if 0 ≤ v <

b
; (3) if 0 ≥ v , then there is no
p

entry.
The corrupt official in central government takes into account that potential
entrants may evade his bribery demands by dealing with local governments in local
jurisdictions. Therefore, the corrupt central official maximizes
Max R(b)=bF(b/p)
The first order condition
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F(b/p)+b/pF’(b/p)=0

(5)

This determines the marginal type of entrepreneur b** dealing with the central
government. Entrepreneurs with low abilities 0 ≤ v * stay out of business, and those with
intermediate abilities 0 ≤ v < v ** operate in local jurisdiction, while high ability
entrepreneurs (v**≤ v) deal with the central government make contributions to the corrupt
central government official.
Proposition: In an economy with corruption, the revenue maximizing bribe
payment b is lower and the total number of entrepreneurs is higher in equilibrium if
government spending authority is decentralized versus completely centralized.
Proof. Evaluate (5) at b*, which is the marginal bribe rate under centralized
corruption: From (1) F(b*)+b*F’(b*)=0. Then for F(b*/p)+b*/pF’(b*/p)=0 to be equal to
(1), the following must be true b**/p=b* . Since 0<p<1, b**<b*.
Lower bribe b leads to lower v, which means lower ability entrepreneurs can enter
the economy, thus increasing the total number of entrepreneurs in the economy. In other
words, direct benefit of decentralization is such that the corrupt official is forced to lower
the bribe rate, which leads to more entry into the economy. The intuition behind the
lowered bribe argument is that the government officials is interested in how much total
bribe revenues he/she can extract from the businesses. If higher bribe rates encourage
entrepreneurs flee into underground economy or into other jurisdictions, then the officials
will be willing to reduce the bribes they ask in order to maximize their total bribe
revenues. According to our model, a reduction in bribe rate does increase the number of
entrepreneurs doing business with the government and willing pay bribes.
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Corruption in Local Government
It is not realistic to assume that local government officials will not demand bribes
from entrepreneurs. How does the result change when we relax that assumption?
The corrupt central government official charges b for allowing each entrepreneur
to operate in his jurisdiction, while one in local jurisdiction demands b1. For an
entrepreneur of type v, the profit from entering the central government jurisdiction has
not changed (P1=v-b), but the profit in local jurisdiction has changed since there is now
bribe demand b1 from the local government: P2=v-pv+b1. For the entrepreneur in local
jurisdiction, there is a probability p of not earning v. In other words, we assume that by
choosing to deal with local government projects, firms face lower quality of
infrastructure, less public goods, etc. We make an assumption that central government
bribes are always greater than local government bribes, b>b1. This assumption is for
computational convenience only, and does not alter the main conclusion of the model.
For given bribery demands b and b1, the entrepreneurs have the following entry
strategies: (1) deal with the central government if

b + b1
≤ v . Entrepreneur will choose to
p

enter into deal with the central government if bribes he has to pay to central government
official is less than the sum of bribe to local government and the expected earnings from
conducting a business in local jurisdiction, b< v(1-p) - b1;
(2) deal with the local government if

b
b1
b + b1
; (3) if 1 > v , then do not
≤v<
1− p
p
1− p

enter.
Compared with the entry configuration in the previous section, bribery demands
by local governments do not fundamentally change our results.
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If we redo the central government official’s maximization problem:
Max R(b)=bF((b-b1)/p)
The first order condition:
F((b***-b1)/p)+b***/pF’((b***-b1)/p=0

(6)

Since the official’s demand schedule b is uniquely determined by v, we can it
more convenient to treat v as the control variable9 in a central government’s bribe
maximization problem under complete centralization:
Max R(v)=w+(v-t)F(v)
The marginal entrant v* that maximizes the corrupt official’s revenue is implicitly
given by the first order condition:
F(v*)+(v*-t)F’(v*)=0

(7)

Under decentralization with zero local bribery v=b/p, then
Max R(v)=pvF(v)
The first order condition
F(v)+vF’(v)=0

(8)

Under decentralization with non-zero local bribery, the maximization problem takes the
following form. Since v=(b-b1)/p
Max R(v)=(pv+b1)F(v)
The first order condition:
F(v***)+vF’(v***)+b1/pF’(v***)=0

(9)

If we evaluate (9) at v** , which is the marginal type of entrepreneur in decentralized
system with no local corruption: From (8) F(v**)+v**F’(v**)=0 and F(v**)+vF’(v**)= -

9

Choi and Thum, 2002
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b1/pF’(v**)>0 and we have ∂R(v ** ) / ∂v f 0 . Thus, v***>v** or b***>b**. Bribes by the
central government are higher under decentralization with local bribery compared to the
setting under decentralization with no local bribery. However, if we evaluate (9) at v* ,
which is the marginal type of entrepreneur in centralized system: From (7)
F(v*)+v*F’(v*)-tF’(v*)=0 and the sign of b1/pF’(v)+tF’(v*)= [b1/p+t]F’(v*)<0 and we
have ∂R(v * ) / ∂v p 0 . Therefore, v***<v* or b***<b*. In other words, bribes by the central
government are lower under decentralization.
The theoretical model suggests that bribe rate and number of firms in the
economy are influenced by the structure of the government, namely whether its spending
authority is decentralized or centralized. For example, if government official receives
bribes in form of kickbacks from corrupting government procurement decisions, our
model predicts that when central government is solely responsible for procurement
decisions, the central government official will ask firms to pay him high bribes.
Centralization may influence the number of firms in the economy through the bribe rates.
If the bribe required to secure government contracts is very high, then only large or firms
with high earnings are likely to afford to stay in business. The bribe rate is influenced by
decentralization as vertical competition for clients serves as a constraint on government
behavior. Central government is subjected to competition if some of the government
functions are devolved to lower levels of governments. Firms can choose to do business
with local governments instead of central governments. Even though local governments
are likely to be corrupt, the bribe required to secure government contracts are lower thus
leading to more entry of smaller companies or companies with lower earning capability.
From the model, we develop the following testable hypotheses:
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The hypothesis is that all else being equal, a change from centralized to
decentralized government structure leads to a decreased bribe rate. The implication is that
if government is decentralized, then competition is likely to occur between the levels of
government to attract the bribe base, assuming the bribe base is not common. For the
base to be not common there needs to be a clear division of expenditure responsibilities.
Bribe rate has to go down if the government at any level of government wants to keep
businesses in its jurisdiction. In other words, under fiscal decentralization it’s in
governments’ interest to lower the corruption. Thus corruption is likely to go down with
greater fiscal decentralization.
In summary, we will use this testable hypothesis to examine the effect of
decentralization on corruption. We empirically investigate the impact of decentralization
in the following chapter. First, we discuss the data and estimation methodology and
finally present the results.

CHAPTER IV. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATIONS
The hypothesis is that decentralization decreases the level of bribes and/or
corruption can be tested empirically. First, we describe the available data sources in detail
for cross country analysis. In the latter part of the chapter we will discuss the variables
used in cross state analysis.

Measures of Corruption
There are four main types of measures available for cross country and panel data
analysis. The first one is based on police reports on actual investigations, prosecution,
and conviction of corrupt officials. In many countries the governments keep track of
statistics on prosecution of public corruption. If we take corruption prosecution per
capita, then we can get corruption data comparable across countries based on hard
evidence. The second type of data is based on crime victimization surveys. These are
based on surveys of victims of various crimes, including those who were asked by the
government to pay bribes. Adjusted for population, this type of data may be a better
alternative to prosecution data because bribery cases often go unreported. On the other
hand, people are more likely to answer questions on their experience with bribery in
responding to a unanimous survey. The third type of measure is based on surveys of
individual experts and experts with multinational corporations. For example,
International Country Risk Guide from PRS Group, Inc.10 assesses political, economical
and financial risks associated with investing in various countries. Risk attributed to the
corruption in government is one of the components of the political risk in that survey.
10

http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html
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There are other similar surveys that rank countries based on corruption, such as the one
from Economic Intelligence Unit. Lastly, there are survey of surveys such as the
Corruption Perception Index from the Transparency International, and governance
indicators from the World Bank. These indices are based on surveys such as International
Country Risk Guide.

Data on Prosecution and Conviction of Corruption Cases
Actual prosecution and conviction data on bribery for cross section of countries
are available from the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of
Criminal Justice Systems.11 The United Nations’ survey asks the governments of
participating countries a series of questions on the main components of the criminal
justice system. The first two surveys covered the period 1970-1980. The latest (eighth
wave to cover the period 2001-2002) survey instrument was sent to 191 Ministers of
Foreign Affairs (UN) in August 2003. It is too early to expect the responses to that
survey. Seventh wave of survey for the period 1998-2000 was sent out to the
governmental institutes of 203 countries in 2001 and as of May 2004, ninety two
countries have responded to the survey. For our study we take the data from the 4th, 5th,
6th, and 7th wave of surveys covering the period 1986-2000.
There are potential problems with regards to the reliability of the data. Only some
crimes are reported by victims to the police, who may only record a portion of reported
incidents in the official data. Cross country comparison of the data may be complicated

11

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_surveys.html accessed on May 30, 2004.
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due to differences in defining specific crime types in different countries, levels of
reporting and traditions of policing, and social, economic and political contexts.
The survey asks the governments to report the number of police reports,
investigations, prosecution, convictions, and punishments for crimes such as murder,
rape, robbery, property theft etc. Among them, bribery and/or corruption is included as
separate crime classification. In the survey “Bribery and/or corruption” may be
understood to mean requesting and/or accepting material or personal benefits, or the
promise thereof, in connection with the performance of a public function for an action
that may or may not be a violation of law and/or promising as well as giving material or
personal benefits to a public officer in exchange for a requested favor.
Rule of law is likely to determine the prosecution effort. If the criminal justice
system is corrupt itself, there is less likelihood of corrupt officials being successfully
prosecuted and convicted. When there is weak rule of law and little trust in the courts and
police, people are less likely to report the crime to the police, thus reducing the reliability
of the data.

Corruption Victimization Surveys
Relatively more reliable data come from crime victimization surveys that are
conducted by International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), a joint project by UNICRI and
UNODC.12
Two types of methodologies have been used by the ICVS to standardize the data.
The first one is CATI methodology for the countries with high telephone penetration, and
12

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime.
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the second one is Face-to-Face methodology for the countries with low telephone
penetration, in most cases the latter are restricted to the capital city. For CATI surveys, a
sample of between 1000 and 2000 households was drawn by random dialing of telephone
numbers. Face-to-Face methodology was adopted in all developing countries and the
countries in central and East Europe. Samples of 1000 respondents were generally drawn
from the population of the largest city, although in a few countries the surveys covered
either several cities.
The survey has run since 1989. Subsequent surveys were conducted in 1992, 1996
and 2000, and the master file consists of 135,465 cases from 92 surveys in 56 countries.
The results of the surveys show that almost nobody was affected by requests for paying
bribes in Western European urban areas (0.2% of population was asked to pay bribes on
average). However, bribery is a serious problem in Central-Eastern European cities (17
percent on average). Requests for bribes by police officers were most frequent, followed
by medical staff, customs officers. Overall, the victimization surveys are more reliable
because there is less underreporting that is present in official corruption prosecution data.
People usually underreport crimes because of lack of confidence in the police and the
judicial system (del Frate and van Kesteren 2004).

Political Risk due to Corruption
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is probably the most widely used
corruption index, partly because of its wide cross country and time series coverage
(Keefer and Knack 1995). Annual data are available starting from 1984 to present,
covering over 100 countries. ICRG’s corruption index is based on an assessment of
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corruption within the political system. They are mainly concerned with the extent of
threat to foreign investment. They assess “the actual or potential corruption in the form of
excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding,
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business,” because these forms of
corruption pose a great “risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular
discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the
development of the black market.”
“The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so
overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, as to provoke a popular
backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or
restructuring of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and
order, rendering the country ungovernable.”13
This corruption index may be biased because tolerance towards corruption varies
across countries. If corruption is more acceptable in one country, then there is less
political risk as a result of corruption. For example, in some of the Asian countries,
corruption is not as politically disruptive as corruption in Latin America.

Data on Perception of Corruption
Arguably, more reliable measures available today are corruption perception
indices mentioned earlier. Some may argue that perception indices could potentially be
inaccurate. But these indices are usually based on survey of individuals and/or

13

http://www.prsgroup.com
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organizations that have had first hand experience with the corruption in those countries.
There is some empirical evidence that finds a positive and significant association between
the corruption perceptions and the willingness to bribe (Cabelkova and Hanousek 2004).
The nuance is that perception of corruption tends to lead people to believe bribing is
necessary or acceptable. Similar results are obtained from a study on Uruguay (Rossi et
al. 2004). Based on survey data for Ukraine Cabelkova and Hanousek find that when
citizens perceive that the government is corrupt, they are likely to offer bribes and the
government officials are likely to accept. This creates a cycle of increased corruption.
Once more and more people start to accept corruption, it becomes much harder to control
the problem. Eventually, corruption becomes a norm and people have to adjust their
behavior to the new reality.
In 1995, Transparency International, a non-governmental body, began using
various opinion surveys to compile an annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
(Transparency International 2004a). The CPI provides data on perceptions of corruption
within countries. It is a composite index that consists of credible sources using different
sampling frames and various methodologies. CPI includes only countries that have some
indicators of corruption from at least three sources, such as Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) and Opacity Index from
PriceWaterHouseCoopers, which increase their validity. All the sources generally define
corruption as a misuse of public power for private benefits, for example bribing of public
officials, kickbacks in public procurement, or embezzlement of public funds. Each of the
sources assesses the extent of corruption among public officials and politicians in the
country. For example, BEEPS asks firms if it is common for firms of their line of
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business to have to pay some irregular additional payments to get things done. Opacity
Index is based on answers to questions on the frequency of corruption in various contexts
such as obtaining export permits, avoiding taxes etc.
There can be several potential biases in perceptions of corruption depending on
who you ask. If you ask the locals about the corruption in their countries, their response
might be biased because the value and standards of ethics likely to differ across countries.
If you ask only expatriates to rate the corruption in a particular country their answers
might be biased as well because they might lack proper understanding of different
cultures. Some of the data sources used in CPI are based on local surveys, while others
are based on survey of expatriates. But there are high correlations between the different
sources used in the CPI, which indicates an overall reliability, and the combination of all
the sources reduces the potential biases.
For this study, year to year comparability of corruption perception index is of
great interest. According to the Transparency International, comparisons to the results
from previous years should be based on a country's score, not its rank. Because a
country's rank can change simply because new countries enter the index and others drop
out. A higher score is an indicator that respondents provided better ratings, while a lower
score suggests that respondents revised their perception downwards. Better rating means
an absence of corruption. However, year-to-year shifts in a country's score can result not
only from a changing perception of a country's performance but also from a changing
sample and methodology. With differing respondents and slightly differing
methodologies, a change in a country's score may also relate to the fact that different
viewpoints have been collected and different questions been asked.
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As compared with the CPI 2001, in 2002 Bangladesh's score has improved by 0.8
points. However, this change was due solely to methodological changes: the new
standardization technique avoids negative numbers. For example, last year the worst
individual score provided to Bangladesh was -1.7. This year the worst standardized score
is 0.3 due to the methodological changes. Bangladesh's original values had remained
largely constant. As a consequence, the higher score in 2002 in no way reflects actual
improvements. Therefore, we will not use the CPI for panel analysis. But, CPI is still
very useful for cross country analysis.
Similar index but with wider sample size is constructed by Kaufmann et al (2003).
They present estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and
territories for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. The six dimensions are:
(1) Voice and Accountability; (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence; (3)
Government Effectiveness; (4) Regulatory Quality; (5) Rule of Law; (6) Control of
Corruption. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring
perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18
different organizations. This indicator is highly correlated with Corruption Perception
Index (above 0.9). Kaufmann et al. (2003) corruption index covers 195 countries, which
is almost twice as many as in CPI. Year to year comparability of this indicator is also
questionable. Thus it is preferable to use the data for cross country analysis only.
Both CPI and Kaufmann et al. (2003) indices are based on surveys such as World
Business Environment Survey (WBES), which is by itself a very appealing data source for
our research. This survey provides useful information specifically with regards to specific
aspect of corruption such as frequency of bribery, bribe as share of firms’ revenues etc.

63
WBES was administered to enterprises in 80 countries in late 1999 and early 2000,
utilizing a standard questionnaire methodology. This comprehensive survey of over
10,000 firms reports enterprise responses to multiple questions on the investment climate
and business environment as shaped by domestic economic policy, governance etc. This
survey analysis is available only for one year, which makes it useful only for crosssectional analysis.
Subsequent studies of WBES are Investment Climate Surveys of the World Bank
Group and the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank. The data
reports on the investment climate and economic decisions of more than 14,000 firms in
over 30 countries. The survey asks questions such as “How much do small, medium and
large firms pay unofficially to "get things done?,” “Which investment climate obstacles
most affect employment and investment?,” and “How much of your revenue do you give
in bribes?” For our empirical test, the responses to the last question are of great interest to
us. Our hypothesis is that decentralization leads to lower bribe payments per firm.
Simple correlation matrix in Table A shows that there are high correlations
between some of the indices. Our main variable of interest Bribe/Revenue rate (Bribe as
share of firms’ revenues) is correlated with victimization rate, and two perception indices.
There is no correlation with conviction rate. Conviction rate is not significantly correlated
with other measures of corruption. High correlations between Bribe/Revenue rate,
Victimization Rate, and Corruption Perception Indices attest to the reliability of these
data sets.
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Table A. Correlation Matrix of Various Corruption Indices
Bribe
/Revenue Conviction Victimization
Rate
Rate
Rate
Conviction
Rate
0.08
Victimization
Rate
-0.06
0.31*
Corruption Risk
0.67***
(ICRG)
0.09
0.25*
Perception
0.18
0.73***
Index (WB)
0.40***
Perception
0.19
0.73***
Index (TI)
0.38**

Corruption Perception
Risk
Index
(ICRG)
(WB)

0.77***
0.86***

0.92***

For source and the descriptive statistics see Table 1.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

It is worth noting that there are several recent studies that attempt to measure
corruption at micro level (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Golden and Picci 2004).
Reinikka and Svensson propose survey techniques to collect a quantitative micro level
data on corruption using public expenditure tracking survey, service provider survey, and
enterprise surveys. Golden and Picci, on the other hand, construct a corruption index for
Italy’s provinces and regions based on the difference between the monies spent on
infrastructure and the existing physical infrastructure. The larger the difference the larger
money is presumed to be siphoned off to mismanagement, fraud, kickbacks and
embezzlement. However, this type of index would be extremely difficult to construct for
large cross section of countries. Thus we do not use this index for our analysis.
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Measure of Decentralization
Another problematic issue is the measurement of the degree of decentralization of
government. Measuring decentralization is a rather difficult task (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002).
Some try to measure by number of subnational jurisdictions, while others measure by
subnational government employment. By far the most widely used measurement is a
subnational share of total government expenditure (Oates 1972; Panizza 1999).
International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFS) has
served as source of data mainly because it provides data that are consistent across
countries.
Our theoretical model predicts that decentralization of government expenditure
responsibilities lead to lower optimal bribes. Subnational share of total government
expenditures is an appropriate measure of expenditure decentralization in the context of
our model. Thus, in this study, decentralization is measured as a subnational share of total
government spending, based on GFS. Subnational expenditure is a sum of local and
provincial/state government total expenditures net of transfers to other levels of
government. For countries which do not report provincial level data, subnational data are
the data for the local government and vice versa. Total expenditure is a sum of
consolidated central government and subnational government expenditures. However, to
eliminate double counting, we have to exclude transfers from central government to
subnational government. Expenditure includes both current and capital expenditures. It
does not include government lending or repayments to the government or government
acquisition of equity for public purposes.
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As of 1996, forty six out of 149 countries report both the national and subnational
level data in GFS. In particular, thirty two countries report central and local level data,
two countries report central and provincial level data, and twelve countries central,
provincial and local level data14. This is not sufficient for careful analysis of
decentralization. We complemented this dataset with data from a variety of sources. For
example, subnational share of total government expenditures for Botswana, Brazil,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Ireland, Israel, Kenya, Nicaragua, Paraguay
and Russian Federation in 1997 are reported by the (World Bank 2000).

Other Explanatory Variables
The theoretical literature suggests that corruption is mainly a function of
economic rents, probability of being caught, ethnic and cultural characteristics,
discretionary power of officials, strength of political institutions, and moral and social
values play some role. But a lack of adequate data sources impedes the empirical
analysis. However, we may be able to proxy for economic rents, probability of being
caught, ethnic and cultural characteristics.

Economic Rents
Ades and Di Tella (1999) provide a support for the proposition that economic
rents would foster corruption. Besides, Goel and Nelson (1998) use size of the public
sector as proxy for the value of economic rents. However, the public sector has many
14

http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/webfiscal.pdf
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elements some of which do not provide high rents, such as health care or education. Thus,
the size of the public sector may not be a good proxy. Some of the least corrupt countries
such as Sweden have large public sectors and very high taxes. It is possible that
governments that are able to raise high revenues are more likely to pay adequate salaries,
and effectively monitor its officers. There is an argument that when governments cannot
raise adequate tax revenues they are likely to rely on indirect revenues such as bribery
(Henderson and Kuncoro 2004). Instead, the involvement of government in the economy
is better measured by extent of its regulations and rules. Heavy government involvement
in economic activities and extensive use of rules and regulations rather than fiscal
instruments are likely to lead to corruption. But it is hard to quantify discretionary power
of government. Economic freedom index from Heritage Foundation is a good proxy.
They define economic freedom as “the absence of government coercion or constraint on
the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent
necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself.”
To measure economic freedom, the authors use 50 independent economic
variables that fall into ten broad categories: trade policy, fiscal burden of government,
government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign
investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black
market activities. The index weighs each factor as equally important to evaluate the
economic freedom in any country. Thus the overall score is average of all ten factor
scores. The scales run from 1 to 5: A score of 1 signifies an institutional or consistent set
of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom, while a score of 5 signifies a
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set of policies that are least conducive. For the latest year which is 2003, the economic
freedom score is reported for 156 countries.15
Another alternative measure of economic rents is an evaluation of the extent of
government’s financially repressive policies. Financial repression takes many forms, and
can be measured in many different ways. The 2001 Milken Institute Capital Access Index
focuses on the direct government inferences in the provision of capital from savers to
borrowers. The 2001 index is based on evaluation of the general macroeconomic
environment, the ease of securing loans from the banks, equity and bond market
development, which is often another way of obtaining finances, and the access to the
international capital. However, the economic freedom index and capital access index a
highly correlated and the estimations results are not significantly different, thus it will
suffice to use one of them, and we chose economic freedom index.

Probability of Being Caught
Probability of detection, strength of political institutions, moral and social values,
and severity of punishment all play role in how corruption is spread. First, an absence of
civil liberties and political rights is a favorable environment for increased corruption
(World Bank 2000). Rights to free and independent media and freedom of speech are
likely to decrease the tolerance of the public to corruption (Moreno 2002). There is
evidence that a long duration of democracy reduces the perception of corruption
(Treisman 2000).

15

www.heritage.org
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There are several indices of civil liberty, political freedom and press freedom.
Civil liberties include the freedom to develop opinions, institutions, and personal
autonomy without interference from the state. Freedom House uses surveys based on
standards drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These standards apply
to all countries and territories, irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or religious
composition, and level of economic development, which makes it objective and, more
importantly, comparable across countries. Besides the civil liberty index, the Freedom
House builds a political rights index. Political rights enable people to participate freely in
the political process. This includes the right to vote and compete for public office and to
elect representatives who have a decisive vote on public policies. Both of the indices are
assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents the most free and 7
the least free. The latest survey, which is for the year 2003, covers 192 countries and 18
territories. The third variable, Freedom of Press index, is constructed by examining the
level of press freedom in each country in three broad categories: the legal environment,
political influences, and economic pressures.
First, the legal environment encompasses an examination of the laws and
regulations that could influence media content as well as the government’s inclination to
use these laws to restrict the ability of media to operate. Second, political control over the
content of news media is evaluated by examining access to information and sources,
editorial independence, official censorship and self-censorship, the ability of the media to
operate freely and without harassment, and the intimidation of journalists by the state or
other actors. Finally, economic pressures on the media are examined. These pressures
include the structure of media ownership, the costs of establishing media outlets as well
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as of production and distribution, the selective withholding of state advertising or
subsidies, official bias in licensing, and the impact of corruption and bribery on content.
Each country is rated in these three categories, with the higher numbers indicating
less freedom. A country’s total score is based on the total of the three categories: a score
of 0–30 places the country in the Free press group; 31–60 in the Partly Free; and 61–100
in the Not Free press group. Survey data come from correspondents overseas, staff travel,
international visitors, the findings of human rights and press freedom organizations,
specialists in geographic and geopolitical areas, the reports of governments and
multilateral bodies, and a variety of domestic and international news media.

Ethnic Fractionalization
The decision of an official to engage in corrupt activities will depend on the
likelihood of him receiving the bribes and kickbacks. In ethnically fractionalized
societies, ethnic communities are likely to provide sanctions against those who do not
keep their promises thus facilitating corruption (Fearon and Laitin 1996). This kind of
corruption contract enforcement is likely to encourage corruption. In addition, public
officials are likely to favor their relatives in societies where family ties are strong (Mauro
1996; Tanzi 1994). Also in ethnically fractionalized societies that corruption is likely to
be more harmful because corruption is likely to be less organized (Shleifer and Vishny
1993).
There are a number of indices available that measure ethno-linguistic
fractionalization. The most commonly used one is the index of ethno linguistic
fractionalization, discussed in Mauro (1995) and originally calculated by Taylor and
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Hudson (1972). This index is based on data from 1960 and constructed in the Soviet
Union for the Atlas Narodov Mira. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization is measured by
the probability of two randomly chosen individuals belonging to different ethnic groups.
EthnicFractionalization = 1 − ∑ (
i

ni 2
)
N

where N is the total population and ni is the number of people belonging to the ith group.
For our analysis we use ethnic fractionalization data constructed by (Alesina et al. 2003).
This dataset provides ethnic fractionalization index for about 190 countries. The apparent
advantage of this index is the coverage of the countries. The formula for calculation of
ethnic fractionalization is the same as the one used in previous studies. The main source
of data are (Central Intelligence Agency 2000; Encyclopedia Britannica 2000).

The Results of OLS Estimations
First model of interest is model 1 in Table 2. The dependent variable is defined as
average bribes paid by the businesses, measured as percent of their revenues. The sample
includes only developing and transition countries. Subnational share of government
spending is associated with bribes as share of revenues negatively and statistically
significantly at 10 percent confidence interval. The coefficients indicate that the elasticity
of bribes with respect to subnational share of spending is 0.2; in other words, if
decentralization is increased by one percent, then the bribes as share of revenues are
likely to fall by 0.2 percent. This result is consistent with the predictions of our
theoretical model that argues that decentralization of expenditures would force competing
officials to bring the amount of bribe per entrepreneur down.
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Equation 2 (Table 2) uses prosecution data to measure corruption. Intuitively, we
would argue that decentralization leads to more competition between levels of
government that result in more prosecution of corruption by each other. Especially, the
central government is likely to step up its efforts to prosecute local corruption.
Eventually, that prosecution effort would bring the total corruption down. Our estimates
show exactly that. Convictions per 100,000 residents are negatively related with our
decentralization variable and the relationship is statistically significant at 5 percent level.
Convictions data are averaged over 1986-2002, because the data for shorter period of
time may not accurately reflect the extent of the corruption problem. For example it takes
a long to time to prosecute and convict on corruption charges. The coefficients shows that
one percent increase in subnational share of total government expenditures would be
associated with 0.55 percent decrease in prosecutions on corruption charges. However,
we have to note that a conviction rate may not be an accurate indicator of corruption in a
society.
The relationship between percent of people asked to pay bribes and
decentralization is statistically significant at 10 percent level. The implication is that
fiscal decentralization is associated with fewer bribe frequency. Our model predicted that
bribe rates would be lower with decentralization. Our empirical analysis shows that both
bribe rate and bribe frequency are lower with fiscal decentralization. A one percent
increase in subnational share of spending leads to 0.44 percent decrease in number of
people asked to pay bribes.
As specified, equations 1 through 3 (Table 2) explain up to two thirds of the
variation of the independent variable. Sample size covers up to 57 developed and
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developing countries. We have to consider an endogeneity of fiscal decentralization
because the degree of fiscal decentralization could be endogenous to the government
system. As we show later on, we find no evidence of endogeneity of fiscal
decentralization.
Bribe rate, conviction rate, frequency of bribery are all measures of different
aspect of bribery. Bribe rate measures the cost of bribery to businesses, conviction rate
shows the extent of government crackdown on bribery, and frequency of bribery
measures how much of the population is affected by the bribery. We find that all three
measures are statistically significantly related with subnational share of government
expenditures. That suggests that fiscal decentralization affects bribery not only in one
aspect but in all aspects. This kind of robustness of the relationship attests the bribery
reducing potential of fiscal decentralization.
All the control variables have expected signs as well. Economic freedom index is
negatively and statistically significantly associated with corruption as one would expect.
The relationship is statistically significant at 1 percent level when corruption is measured
by victimization rate. In other cases, the statistical significance is not as strong, but not
small either. The relationship confirms the claim that a greater economic freedom from
the government regulations and interventions leads to lower corruption. The elasticity of
the relationship is very high. One percent increase in economic freedom index leads to
over three percent decrease in corruption victimization rate. Elasticity is a little lower for
the conviction rate, but still greater than one.
Freedom of press is likely to be associated with lower corruption. When
corruption is measured by crime statistics, the relationship is not strong. The estimated
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coefficients are small that there is not need to discuss further. But, when corruption
perception indices are used to estimate the relationship, the relationship between freedom
of press and corruption indices is much stronger. We’ll discuss those results later on.
The next variable of interest is ethnic fractionalization. Ethnically divided
countries are likely to have more corruption because the relationships and favor
mechanisms are likely to be easier to form. Ethnic fractionalization, measured as a
probability of two randomly drawn individuals belonging to different ethnic groups, is
positively associated with corruption perception indices and the relationship is
statistically significant at one percent level in equations 3 (Table 2).
In equation 1 (Table 3), political risk due to corruption is a dependent variable.
The relationship is negative and statistically significant at 10 percent level. That suggests
that the risk faced by private entities due to corruption in government is reduced by fiscal
decentralization. The last two equations use the corruption perception indices to test the
relationship between corruption and decentralization. Subnational share of expenditures
is negatively associated with both World Bank Governance Indicator and Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index and statistically significant at one percent
level. When Transparency International’s corruption perception index is used for
estimation, the relationship is negative and significant at 5 percent level.
All other independent variables takes expected the signs and the relationships are
statistically significant mostly at one percent level. Economic freedom and freedom of
press indices are associated with lower corruption perception, while ethnic
fractionalization index is positively related with corruption. As specified, the models
explain up over three fourth of the variation in corruption indices.
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Ordinal Nature of the Corruption Indices
However, we should not completely rely on OLS results because the corruption
indices are ordinal in nature. Although the corruption indices are scores, they are based
on survey results. Under corruption we understand the response to a survey question such
as - “Based on your experience, how would you evaluate the corruption in this country?,”
on a scale from 0 to 6, where 0 means “wide spread corruption” and 6 means “no
corruption at all.” It is hard to say if a country with score of 2 is twice as corrupt as the
country with score of 4. That’s why we need to re-estimate the relationship between
fiscal decentralization and corruption perception indices using ordered logit models.
Since the scores in corruption perception indices are not integers, we need to round the
numbers to the nearest integer.
The results of ordered logit models are given in Table 3. The equations 4-6 are
estimated by ordered logit. The negative coefficient for subnational share of expenditures
means that the likelihood of scoring high on corruption index did go down with higher
fiscal decentralization. However, statistically the relationship is not very strong except
when the Transparency International’s Corruption perception index is used.
The use of probability models for ordered responses lends itself to the
interpretation of parameters in terms of marginal probability effects. The question is:
How does the probability of observing a certain outcome change if one of the
independent variables changes? We are mainly interested in the effect of a change in
fiscal decentralization on the probability of government being more or less corrupt. The
estimated marginal probability effects are reported in Table 4. How does ceteris paribus
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increase in subnational share of government expenditures affect the probability of
country receiving a certain corruption score? The standard ordered logit model in Table 4
shows, for example, a value of -0.0037 for corruption perception index. That means that
the probability of receiving a score of 7 on corruption perception index decreases by
0.0037 points if we increase subnational share of government expenditures by 1
percentage points. Seven is one of the higher scores on corruption index, in other words,
the probability of being perceived more corrupt is lower when the subnational share of
expenditures increases.

Endogeneity
There is a potential endogeneity problem with the estimation of the relationship
between decentralization and corruption. Our model predicted that when central
government decentralizes the system and devolves the finances, the bribery is likely to
decrease. If corruption is widespread, then it would not be in the interests of the central
government to devolve responsibilities to lower levels. By decentralizing the government
the central government would likely be forced to lower the bribes it ask. The central
government may resist the fiscal decentralization and attempt to centralize the
expenditure decisions. If that is true, then it could create an endogeneity bias in our
estimations.
We test for endogeneity of subnational share of expenditures by estimating the
same equations with two stage least squares. The instrumental variables are GDP per
capita, population, and geographical area. These are typical instruments used to estimate
the degree of fiscal decentralization (Arzaghi and Henderson 2004; Oates 1972; Panizza
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1999). The easiest way to check for presence of endogeneity is to compare the OLS and
2SLS estimates and determine whether the differences are statistically significant
(Hausman 1978; Wooldridge 2002). The results of the estimations are virtually identical
to the OLS results and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis thus
there is no evidence of endogeneity.
Although Durbin-Wu-Hausman test fails to reject the null, there is a concern over
the instrumental variables. In some cases the instruments do not explain much of the
variation. The instruments chosen, GDP per capita, population, and geographic area, are
almost standard instruments for fiscal decentralization and widely used as determinants
of decentralization. There is a theoretical argument for using these variables as
instruments, it is important to note that they may have not worked too well in some of the
equations (See Table 2).

Panel Analysis
It is important to note that most of the research on corruption has been done with
cross-sectional data. In addition to cross country analysis, we do an unbalanced panel
data analysis. We have two potential corruption data useful for panel analysis: corruption
conviction rate and the political risk due to corruption. We have missing years for at least
some cross-sectional units in the sample, mainly in fiscal decentralization variable. Fiscal
decentralization data covers the period 1972-2001, but many of the countries do not
report data every year. Our longest time-series corruption data (political risk of
corruption) are for the period 1984-2002. But the explanatory variables, index of
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economic freedom and freedom of press indicators, are limited to 1995-2002. That
shrinks our total time-series to the 1995-2002.
We will use only the index of political risk due to corruption for panel analysis
because the year to year variation in corruption conviction rate data may not accurately
reflect the increase and decrease in corruption over time. It is likely to take long time to
prosecute and convict someone on corruption charges, thus conviction is less likely to
take place in same year in which the corruption occurred. Prosecution effects are likely to
vary depending on what party is in the office, how high is corruption prosecution on the
priority list of the law enforcement agencies, etc. Therefore, the corruption conviction
rate is not very accurate data for panel analysis.
A definite advantage of pooling time series and cross-sectional data is the
increased degrees of freedom. However, a primary motivation for using panel data is to
solve the omitted variables problem. Consider, for example, the hypothesized impact of
decentralization on corruption. Examining the hypothesis with cross-sectional data could
miss the potential influence of unobserved, country specific factors on corruption. We
might erroneously reject or fail to reject the hypothesis of interest if decentralization was
partially correlated with the unobserved, country specific factors. By utilizing panel data
we can control for these unobservable effects, mitigating the potential problem of omitted
variable bias (Baltagi 2001; Hsiao 1986; Wooldridge 2002).
In our analysis we will use the two-way random effects model for unbalanced
panel data. Two-way analysis holds a strong intuitive appeal. We want to study the
impact of decentralization on corruption over time on large number of countries. Limiting
ourselves to one-way analysis could prevent the data from revealing the evolution of
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these relationships across countries or through time and create omitted variables bias if
the excluded effects were jointly significant.

Unbalanced Panel Data: Two-way Random Effects Model
Consider the regression model for two-way error components model (Baltagi
2001),
yit = xitβ + uit
uit = µi + λt + vit

i = 1,…,Nt; t=1,…,Ti

where xit is a vector of regressors, and Nt is the number of countries observed in year t.
The components of the error term, uit are the unobservable country specific effect, µi; the
unobservable time specific effect, λt; and the stochastic disturbance term, vit.
The question is whether uit should be treated as a random effect or fixed effect. In
cases where the key independent variables do not vary much over time, fixed effects
method can lead to imprecise estimates. The average standard deviation over the period
1996-2001 is 1.5 for decentralization index, 2.3 for economic freedom index, and 2.7 for
press freedom index.
In random effects model, we assume that time and country specific effects are
randomly distributed and that the parametric function varies from country to country. In
contrast to fixed effects model, we assume that the unobservable country specific effects,
µi, time specific effect, λt, and stochastic disturbance term, vit are each identically,
independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance. In addition, µi, λt, and vit
are independent of each other and xit for all i and t. When these assumption hold, the
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random effect model produces consistent and more efficient estimates than fixed effect
model.
The key consideration in choosing between a random effects and fixed effects
approach is whether µi and xit are correlated. Hausman (1978) proposed a test based on
the difference between the random effects and fixed effects estimates. Since fixed effect
is consistent when µi and xit are correlated, but random effect is inconsistent, a
statistically significant difference is interpreted as evidence against the random effects
assumption of orthogonality between µi and xit.
H0: µi and xit are uncorrelated. Random effects model consistent and efficient.
HA: µi and xit are correlated. Fixed effects model is consistent but not efficient,
GLS is not consistent.
Test statistic: m = (b − β ) ' [mb − m β ] −1 (b − β ) ~ χ k2 under H0.
The results of panel data analysis are given in Table 5. Political risk due to
corruption is negatively related with subnational share of total government spending and
the relationship is statistically significant at five percent level. The Hausman test revealed
that random effects estimation is preferred to fixed effects. The Hausman test H values
are about 4. More precisely, we have a χ2 statistics of 3.98 with 4 degrees of freedom, and
the probability value of 0.41. Clearly, random effects model is preferred to fixed effects
model. Other explanatory variables have the expected signs as well and the relationships
are statistically significant at one percent level. Economic freedom and freedom of press
are negatively associated with corruption. Ethnically fractionalized countries pose more
political risk due to corruption.
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Again, we should not forget that the corruption index is more ordinal variable
than linear variable. Although the corruption indices are scores, they are based on survey
results. We re-estimate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption
perception indices using ordered logit models.
The results of the ordered logit model estimations are given in Table 5. See the
second column for the equations by ordered logit. The negative coefficient for
subnational share of expenditures means that the likelihood of scoring high on corruption
index did go down with higher fiscal decentralization. The relationship is statistically
significant at 10 percent level. Other explanatory variables have the expected signs and
the relationships are statistically strong as well. The magnitude of the ordered logit
coefficient does not have a simple interpretation, but its sign and statistical significance
agree with the linear regression results. But we are also interested in the effect of a
change in fiscal decentralization on the probability of government being more or less
corrupt. The estimated marginal probability effects are reported in Table 6. How does
ceteris paribus increase in subnational share of government expenditures affect the
probability of country receiving a certain corruption score? The standard ordered logit
model in Table 6 shows, for example, the probability of country scoring 0 on a corruption
index (which is no corruption) increases by 0.0010 percentage points if we increase
subnational share of expenditures by one percentage points. Similarly, the probability of
scoring 1 is increase by the increase in subnational share of expenditure. On the other
hand, the probability of scoring a little higher on corruption index (which is being more
corrupt) decreases with higher subnational share of expenditures.
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Overall, the panel data estimation results confirm the results of the cross-sectional
estimations. The higher subnational share of total government expenditures is
consistently associated with lower corruption, whether corruption is measures by crime
statistics or perception indices.

Corruption and Decentralization in the United States
Although we find that subnational share of government expenditures is negatively
and significantly associated with corruption, we have to bear in mind that
decentralization is a multi-faceted, broad concept. The literature provides distinctions
among deconcentration, delegation, and devolution (Litvack et al. 1998; Rondinelli
1981). Deconcentration is dispersal of certain central government responsibilities to
regional offices. This is not real decentralization because there is no transfer of authority
from the central government to subnational governments. Next, delegation is a process
where the central government transfers responsibilities for decision-making and
administration of functions to subnational governments, but subnational governments are
held accountable to the central government. Although the subnational governments have
some discretion, they still have to act according to the central government’s wishes.
Lastly, devolution happens when central government transfers authority for decisionmaking and finance to subnational governments. Under devolution, local governments
elect their leaders and raise their own revenue to finance the expenditure needs they
identify. We are interested in devolution of authority to spend and raise revenues in our
analysis because according to the literature, the advantages of decentralization are likely
to materialize when subnationals have true autonomy and authority over fiscal resources
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(Bahl 1999a, 1999b; Jain 2001; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003; Rose-Ackerman
1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
If both revenue and expenditure authority are decentralized, then citizens could
“evaluate the relative performance of governments in terms of the tightness of
wicksellian connections--both for horizontal and vertical competition” (Breton and
Fraschini 2003). Breton and Fraschini define wicksellian connection as “a link between
the quantity of a particular good or service supplied by centers of power and the taxprice
that citizens pay for that good or service.” Thus, decentralization of revenue authority
might help to reduce corruption through increased accountability of governments.
Subnational governments are likely to be held more accountable to their constituents
because there is a better link between specific taxes and expenditure at lower level of
government, and local citizens have greater control over local governments since they
can vote them out if they suspect wrongdoings (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2004).
We hypothesize that the greater revenue autonomy and revenue decentralization
will lead to lower corruption. Due to lack of international comparable data on revenue
autonomy, a meaningful cross country analysis is not possible at this moment. To test the
hypothesis we use the data from the United States. Along with revenue decentralization
measures, we use various measures of decentralization to analyze the link between
corruption and decentralization. There is a newly available data on perception of
corruption across states that provide cross-state comparison of corruption (Boylan and
Long 2003).
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Measures of Corruption in the United States
The United States, according to Transparency International, is one of the least
corrupt countries. In 2003, The United States was 18th out of 133 countries ranked by the
absence of corruption. Although the United States ranks very high on that list the
problem of public corruption is not non-existent. According to the Department of Justice,
there were 1,011 convictions on corruption charges in the United States in 2002. Forty
two percent of the convictions were convictions of federal officials, while 39 percent of
them were of state and local officials. Others were convictions of private citizens
involved with public corruption.
Most of the studies on cross-state analysis of corruption for the United States are
based on this corruption conviction data (Fisman and Gatti 2002b; Glaeser and Saks
2004; Goel and Nelson 1998; Meier and Holbrook 1992). However, prosecution and
conviction data do not necessarily provide adequate measurement of corruption, because
prosecutors have discretion over how much effort to put into corruption investigation.
Also, federal prosecutions may be affected by state prosecutions. When a state has fewer
resources to fight corruption, the federal government may step up the prosecution efforts.
These corruption prosecution data do not include prosecution of corruption cases by the
state governments. That further jeopardizes the reliability of the data. We are not able to
find any significant relationship between prosecution of corruption and any of the
decentralization indicators that we have used.
However, the number of corruption prosecutions shows that corruption in the
public sector in the United States is not a thing of the past. But we have to note that the
situation has significantly improved over the last century (Glaeser and Goldin 2004). By
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constructing an index based on word counts from large number of newspapers from 1815
to 1975 and supplemented with other materials, they find that the United States was once
considerably more corrupt than today, particularly during 1870s the corruption index was
about five times higher than in 1970s. That suggests that the corruption has been
decreasing in the United States, but it is not completely eliminated.
Corruption prosecution data also show that there are variations across states in the
number of prosecutions per capita, and per public servants. But these data are not
adequate measure of true extent of corruption for above mentioned reasons. Thus we
cannot comfortably use the data to analyze the cross state variation of corruption. If data
on prosecution of corruption cannot depict the true reality, then what is the best way to
measure corruption? Recently, Boylan and Long (2003) constructed a dataset on
perception of state house reporters’ perceptions of public corruption in the United States.
Although likely to be subjective, this type of perception data provides an alternative to
federal corruption prosecution data.
Boylan and Long (2003) surveyed State House reporters to compare corruption
across the states in the U.S. State House reporters are members of the press who cover
state government. Arguably, the reporters are some of the best informed people on state
affairs and are a relatively homogeneous group of people. That makes it easier to
administer the survey across states, and the results of the survey are comparable across
states.
They sent out survey questionnaires to 834 state house reporters in 1999. The
overall response rate was 36.7 percent. Since there were no responses from three states,
the final index includes 47 states. They rank states based on responses on one of the
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questions in the survey, which asks reporters to rank their state on overall corruption.
That question was chosen because of overall similarity of responses to that question by
reporters within each state. The possible scores range from 1 to 7, seven being the most
corrupt. North Dakota, South Dakota, and Colorado ranked the least corrupt, while New
Mexico, Louisiana, and Rhode Island ranked the most corrupt out of 47 states.
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey are not included in the index. Further,
we exclude Hawaii and Alaska and leave 45 continental states’ data in the sample.

Measure of Decentralization in the United States
We have six measures of decentralization each showing certain aspects of
decentralization. The most commonly used measures of fiscal decentralization in cross
country analyses are subnational shares of total government expenditures or revenues.
These two indicators show the authority of local governments over expenditures and
revenues. We use these to test the hypothesis that decentralization creates incentives for
local governments to promote a favorable economic environment such as reduced
corruption. The next two measures are autonomy (Akai and Sakata 2002) and
accountability (Hovey and Hovey 2001). Autonomy, share of own source revenue in
local total revenue, measures the fiscal independence of local governments from the state
government, while accountability shows how much of their expenditures local
governments cover from their own revenue sources. They will be used to test the
hypothesis that decentralization, through increased accountability, can reduce the
corruption. The last two indicators are employment decentralization and number of local
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government per 10,000 citizens. The larger the number of local government the higher is
the competition between jurisdictions.
1. Expenditure decentralization: We take local share of combined state and local
government expenditures as an indicator of decentralization of expenditure authority. We
use direct general expenditure to calculate the ratio. That means intergovernmental
transfers are not included in this calculation. This variable captures the extent of local
governments’ authority over spending decisions.
2. Revenue decentralization: local government share of combined state and local
government revenue is a measure of revenue authority enjoyed by the local governments.
We use only the general revenue from own sources and exclude the transfers received
from other levels of government because these intergovernmental transfers are either
conditional or matching grants. Average local revenue authority is 40.7 percent, while
average local expenditure authority is 53.8 percent (See Table 8). That suggests a gap in
financing and expenditure by local governments. This gap is filled with transfers from
higher levels of government. If most of the revenues come from other levels of
government these two indicators may not show the true level of decentralization. That is
why we need to measure the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
3. Fiscal autonomy: This indicator measures the fiscal independence by local
governments. Even if local share of expenditure and revenues are low, the local
governments may still be considered to be more decentralized if they raise most of their
revenues from own sources. It is calculated as a share of total local government revenues
that are from own sources. For example, local share of total state and local government
revenues are 35 percent in Connecticut, which is one of the lowest in the United States
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(See Table 8). But Connecticut ranks among one of the highest in terms of revenue
autonomy. In other words, the local governments in Connecticut do not collect the most
revenues but the revenues they do collect are mostly from their own sources.
4. Fiscal accountability: Fiscal accountability is measured by share of local
government expenditures that are financed by own source revenues. The greater the share
of local government expenditures are financed by revenues from own sources, the greater
the accountability of local governments with regards to budget resources. In other words,
local governments are held more accountable to the local residents who pay the taxes,
rather than the higher level of government that transfers resources to local governments.
Otherwise government spending can be excessive because the elected officials do not
have to account to taxpayers for raising it. Michigan’s example provides an interesting
story. Although local governments in Michigan account for 61 percent of the state and
local government expenditures, they only finance about 48 percent of their spending from
own source revenues (See Table 8). That is what is called “accountability gap” (Hovey
and Hovey 2001).
5. Employment decentralization: It is measured as a local share of full time total
state and local government employees. The intuition behind the variables is pretty simple.
When governments are more decentralized, the local governments are likely to hire more
people because their revenue and expenditure responsibilities increase. That requires
additional manpower. More people are likely to be employed by the local governments if
the responsibilities of local governments increase. Stronger and more powerful local
governments can provide competition to the state governments in terms of service
delivery.
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6. Number of local jurisdictions: Jurisdictional decentralization is measured as the
number of local governments in each state per 10,000 people. This variable is of most
interest for our analysis because it captures the effect of the competition between
jurisdictions within a state. The argument is that as the number of competing jurisdictions
grows, the horizontal competition between these jurisdictions induces local governments
curb their corruption to attract businesses to their jurisdictions. Also this variable is
suitable because of the uniformity of definition of local government across states in the
United States. Local governments consist of counties, municipal governments, townships,
school districts, and special districts for natural resources, fire protection, and housing
and community development.

Table B. Simple Correlation Matrix of Decentralization Indicators
Fiscal
Fiscal
Employment
Expenditure Revenue
Decentral.
Decentral. Autonomy Accountability Decentral.
Revenue
0.72
Decentralization
Fiscal
0.11
0.70
Autonomy
Fiscal
0.06
0.66
0.97
Accountability
Employment
0.82
0.72
0.25
0.22
Decentralization
Number of Local -0.22
-0.09
-0.001
0.02
-0.24
Jurisdictions
Source: Constructed by the author from the US Census data.

Control Variables
Corruption depends on many factors. We include a number of control variables to
avoid omitted variable bias. These control variables are analogous to many of the control
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variables used in cross sectional analysis of corruption. First, we control for share of
population in metropolitan areas. Because of congestion, proximity, and competition for
scarce resources, the corruption is likely to be higher in densely populated urban areas
(Alt and Lassen 2003). Also, there is evidence that trust networks and corruption are
substitutes. In smaller cities, people are likely to form a bond of trust, whereas in larger
cities individuals are likely to resort to bribery (Hunt 2004). Intuitively, large cities are
likely to have more corruption because there is greater concentration of businesses, they
are centers of political life, and bureaucracies decide about larger budgets. Therefore, we
choose a metropolitan population as a share of total state population as a control variable.
Next, the fight against corruption may start with educating the children and
teaching them the values of a clean society. Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) show that the
economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption in a framework of an
overlapping generation model with transmission of values. They assume that agents can
either be corrupt or honest and newborn agents form their preferences according to
parents’ effort to educate them and the general corruption level in the society. Principles
can leave the high corruption state by promising a better future for the children. For their
children’s sake, parents exert higher education effort thus increasing the proportion of
moral agents. According to them, educating the young ones is the most effective tool in
fighting corruption. We use educational attainment of the state population as a proxy for
education. It is measured by percent of population with high school or higher education.
Lastly, van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) suggest that if government sector
wages are low relative to other sectors, the government bureaucrats are likely to be more
prone to corruption. If government employees are not adequately paid and their earnings
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are not enough to cover their basic needs, they will have to supplement their income by
accepting bribes. We control for this by creating a variable: Average government sector
wage adjusted for the cost of living. The intuition behind the variables is that if average
government pay is low, then the government employees are likely to be more willing to
accept additional income from bribery. See Table 5 for summary statistics of variables.

The Results of the Cross State Estimations
The ordinary least squares model that is estimated is:
Corruptioni = α + β Decentralizationi + γ Control_Variablesi + εi ,
where Control_Variablesi are share of metropolitan population, average government
sector wages and percent of population with at least high school education, and εi is the
error term.
The results of OLS estimations are presented in Table 8. Column 1 reports the
estimations for the base equation. Share of metropolitan population and educational
attainment are statistically significantly associated with perception of corruption. The
signs are as predicted. Larger share of metropolitan share is associated with more
perceived corruption, while higher education attainment of population is negatively
related to corruption. Average government wages adjusted for the cost of living is
negatively and significantly associated with corruption as well.
Each of the subsequent columns has one of the decentralization indicators added
to the base equation. For example, column 3 shows that higher local share of total state
and local government revenues is negatively and significantly associated with lower
perceived level of corruption.
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Columns 4 and 5 show that revenue autonomy and accountability are negatively
associated with corruption and the relationship is significant at 1 percent level. These
results do not support some of the arguments in the literature that suggest that greater
fiscal autonomy of local governments tends to lead to overprovision of public goods and
services to local elites at the expense of non-elites, in other words, corruption (Bardhan
and Mookherjee 2001). On the contrary, the relationship is very strong both statistically
and economically. By looking at the estimated coefficients, one can see that revenue
decentralization has more impact on corruption compared to other measures of
decentralization. For example, increasing the local share of state and local revenues leads
to 0.06 point decrease in corruption perception index, while the local share of state and
local expenditures decreases the corruption index by about 0.04 points.
Local share of total state and local government employment and number of local
governments are also statistically significantly associated with corruption.
We developed a hypothesis that corruption is lower when government is more
decentralized, based on the literature that suggest decentralization creates incentives for
local governments to promote healthy economic environment, increases the
accountability of local governments to the local residents, and leads to intergovernmental
and interjurisdictional competition. Empirical analysis shows that overall fiscal
decentralization of the states is associated with lower perceived corruption. Various
indicators of decentralization are negatively and statistically significantly associated with
the corruption across states in the U.S.
The coefficient estimates of the equations show that the relationships between
revenue decentralization, autonomy and corruption are the strongest economically. That
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suggests revenue autonomy has the most impact on corruption. That is consistent with the
theoretical arguments that suggest that the benefits of decentralization are the greatest if
revenue autonomy is devolved to local governments.
Coefficient estimates for the base equation tell an interesting story. If the share of
population in metropolitan areas were to increase by one percentage point, then the
perception of corruption increases by 0.04 points. One percentage point increase in share
of population with high school or higher education decreases corruption by around 0.002
points.
Next, we re-estimate the models with ordered logit, since our dependent variable
is not strictly linear variable. Just like the cross country corruption perception indices, the
cross state index of corruption perception is based on survey results. As we’ve discussed
earlier, the survey asks the respondents to evaluate their states by answering to a survey
that asks them to choose from answers--very high level of corruption to no corruption at
all. The results of ordered logit estimations are given in Table 9.
The predictions of the logit model are similar to those of the linear estimations
with a few exceptions. All the decentralization indicators are negatively related with
corruption and the relationship is statistically significant except for the number of local
governments per ten thousand residents. Educational attainment is seldom significantly
associated with corruption, although the expected sign is obtained. Overall, all the
expected signs are observed. Average wages are not significantly associated with
corruption except the case when fiscal decentralization is measured by revenue
decentralization, autonomy and accountability. Metropolitan share of population is
consistently significantly related with corruption.

94
The marginal probability effects are reported in Table 10. The results show that
the probability of scoring zero on corruption index (which is very low level of corruption)
increases with greater decentralization, with the exception of the number of local
governments. For example, the probability of state scoring 0 on corruption index
increases by 0.0043 percentage points if the revenue autonomy (own source revenues as
share of total local government revenues) increases by one percentage point. But, the
marginal effects do not say much about the probability of scoring high on corruption
scale. Overall, the results of ordered logit estimation confirm the predictions of the linear
estimations. Higher share of local expenditures, revenues and employment, revenue
autonomy, and local government’s fiscal accountability all lead to cleaner score on
corruption perception index. In particular the effects of revenue decentralization and
revenue autonomy on corruption are relatively greater compared to the other forms of
decentralization.

Endogeneity
Just as in a cross country analysis, there is a potential endogeneity problem with
the estimation of the relationship between decentralization and corruption in the US. By
decentralizing to local levels the state governments would likely to lower the bribes they
ask if they compete with local governments for the “bribe base.” State governments may
be tempted to try to centralize the fiscal responsibilities. If that is the case, then our
estimates may suffer from endogeneity bias.
We test for endogeneity of local share of expenditure and revenue, local fiscal
autonomy, local government fiscal accountability, local share of employment, and the
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number of local governments by estimating the same equations with two stage least
squares. The instrumental variables are personal income per capita, state population, and
the median distance from local government centers to the state capital. These are proxies
for income and size factors and are similar to the ones we’ve used for cross country
study. As we’ve mentioned before, these are typical instruments used to predict the
degree of fiscal decentralization. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity fails to
reject the null hypothesis thus there is no evidence of endogeneity (See Table 9).

CONCLUSION
The main conclusion of the paper is that fiscal decentralization does have a role in
how people see their governments. Consistent with the theoretical model, we find that
fiscal decentralization induces public officials to reduce bribes they charge per firm thus
reducing bribery cost to entrepreneurs. This is verified both by cross country and panel
data analysis using various corruption indices. Secondly, fiscal decentralization has a
little impact on corruption perception index. In other words, greater fiscal
decentralization is not likely to translate into better ranking on corruption perception
index. Lastly, not all aspects of decentralization have an equal impact on corruption.
Based on a cross state analysis, we find that states that decentralize revenue raising
authority and give more revenue authority to local governments were perceived to be less
corrupt, while decentralization of expenditure, increase in number of local jurisdictions,
and increasing local government employment do not decrease corruption. This is an
important result because countries around the world and international organizations are
interested in the implications of fiscal decentralization policies. In particular, the effect of
various aspects of decentralization on corruptibility of government and the quality of
public office are of great interest. Cross country analysis is hampered by the lack of
adequate decentralization data. Availability of data for the states makes it possible to test
the hypotheses in the literature and suggest that decentralization of government is likely
to be associated with lower corruption of government if subnational governments are
given revenue autonomy. Cross state analysis of corruption is appealing because there are
little cultural, institutional, and political variations across the states that need to be
controlled in cross country analysis.
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Future research should try to draw a finer line between grand corruption and petty
corruption. Grand corruption, also known as political corruption, is a more serious
problem than petty corruption (Transparency International 2004c). More theoretical
analysis is needed to understand why people see grand corruption as more harmful than
petty corruption. One possibility is that people see petty corruption as a way to around the
inefficient bureaucracy, just as argued by Leff (1964).

APPENDICES
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

Bribe as Percent of Revenues

44

3.88

1.68

0.6

8.6

Convictions per 100,000 people

73

0.85

1.24

0.0

8.6

Percent of People Asked to Pay Bribe

46

12.18

11.81

0.1

59.1

Political Risk due to Corruption

96

2.48

1.29

0.0

5.0

Governance Indicator: Corruption

81

4.06

2.92

0.0

9.0

Corruption Perception Index

74

5.04

2.56

0.0

9.0

Subnational Share of Total Government Expenditures

78

23.33

16.00

1.9

72.8

Economic Freedom Index

156

37.17

14.84

0.0

73.6

Freedom of Press Index

181

53.36

24.34

0.6

94.4

Ethnic Fractionalization Index

184

0.43

0.26

0.0

0.9

Source: Bribes as Percent of Revenues - Investment Climate Surveys of the World Bank Group and the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Surveys of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank. Convictions per 100,000 Residents - United Nations Survey on
Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. Percent of People Asked to Pay Bribes - International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), a joint
project by United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Political Risk of Corruption –
International Country Risk Guide. The PRS Group, Inc. Corruption Perception Index – Transparency International. Governance Indicator (Corruption) World Bank Institute. Subnational Share of Total Expenditure- Government Finance Statistics, International Monetary Fund. Economic Freedom – Heritage
Foundation. Freedom of Press – Freedom House. Fractionalization – Alesina et al. 2003.
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Table 2. Results of OLS and 2SLS Estimations
Bribe as
Convictions
Percent
per 100,000
of
people
Revenues1
[1]
[2]

Percent of
People
Asked to
Pay Bribe
[3]

Percent of
Bribe as Convictions
per 100,000
People
Percent
people
Asked to Pay
of
Bribe
Revenues1
[4]
[5]
[6]

Constant

4.06***
(3.82)

4.78**
(2.01)

16.77***
(6.81)

3.86
(1.61)

5.81**
(2.04)

18.81***
(6.02)

Subnational Share of Total
Government Expenditures

-0.20*
(-1.72)

-0.55**
(-2.17)

-0.44*
(-1.70)

-0.16
(-0.33)

-0.81*
(-1.94)

-1.33**
(-2.04)

Economic Freedom Index

-0.60
(-1.60)

-1.21
(-1.47)

-3.23***
(-2.89)

-0.58
(-1.47)

-1.28
(-1.51)

-3.11**
(-2.42)

Freedom of Press Index

-0.02
(-0.19)

0.03
(0.06)

-0.22
(-0.20)

-0.01
(-0.03)

0.03
(0.05)

-0.17
(-0.09)

Ethnic Fractionalization
Index

0.03
(0.19)

-0.18
(-0.90)

0.78***
(2.88)

0.05
(0.18)

-0.25
(-1.11)

0.87***
(2.77)

Method of Estimation
# observations
R2

OLS
29
0.23

OLS
57
0.12

OLS
41
0.61

2SLS
29
0.07

2SLS
56
0.10

2SLS
41
0.21

Source: See Table 1.
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data are averages of 1996-2002. All variables are in logarithms.
For 2SLS R2 from the first stage is reported.
1
includes only developing and transition countries.
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Table 3. Results of OLS and Ordered Logit Estimations
Political Risk
Governance
due to
Indicator:
Corruption
Corruption
[1]
[2]
***
Constant
5.16
10.51***
(11.68)
(14.13)
*
Subnational Share of Total
-0.010
-0.008***
Government Expenditures
(-1.88)
(-2.98)
***
-0.12***
Economic Freedom Index
-0.03
(-2.83)
(-7.04)
-0.04***
Freedom of Press Index
-0.03***
(-3.89)
(-4.14)
Ethnic Fractionalization
0.52
3.36***
(4.71)
Index
(1.28)
µ1
µ2
µ3
µ4
µ5
µ6
µ7
µ8
µ8
Method of Estimation
OLS
OLS
# observations
96
81
2
2
R (Pseudo R )
0.53
0.78
Log Likelihood Function

Corruption
Perception
Index
[3]
11.16***
(14.97)
-0.022**
(-2.28)
-0.12***
(-7.27)
-0.02**
(-2.05)
2.87***
(4.25)

OLS
74
0.77

Political Risk
due to
Corruption
[4]
-0.014
(-1.21)
-0.05**
(-2.46)
-0.05***
(-3.71)
1.32
(1.44)
1.43***
2.97***
5.78***
8.11***
8.67***

Governance
Indicator:
Corruption
[5]

-0.018
(-1.41)
-0.15***
(-6.72)
-0.05***
(-3.82)
4.47***
(4.61)
2.36***
3.53***
4.93***
5.63***
6.66***
7.77***
8.96***
10.28***
13.25***
Ordered Logit Ordered Logit
96
81
0.22
0.31
-117.97
-126.12

Corruption
Perception
Index
[6]
-0.026*
(-1.83)
-0.16***
(-5.79)
-0.04**
(-2.38)
4.27***
(4.06)
2.76***
3.53***
4.37***
5.26***
6.74***
7.98***
10.39***
13.68***
15.07***
Ordered Logit
74
0.31
-105.94

Source: See Table 1; Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data are averages of the period 1996-2002 in models 2,3,5, and 6. In
models 1 and 4, variables are averaged over the period 1984-2002. 1 includes only developing and transition countries.
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Table 4. Marginal Effects for Ordered Logit Models
CORICRG
=0
=1
=2
DECENTRA
0.0005
0.0011
0.0019
(0.0004)
(0.0009)
(0.0017)
ECONFREE 0.0017**
0.0041**
0.007**
(0.0008)
(0.0018)
(0.0033)
ETHFRAC
-0.0417
-0.1016
-0.1727
(0.0297)
(0.071)
(0.1098)
PRESSFRE
0.0017*** 0.0042*** 0.0071***
(0.0006)
(0.0012)
(0.0025)
CORRUPT
=0
=1
=2
DECENTRA
0.0001
0.0011
0.0017
(0.0001)
(0.0008)
(0.0032)
ECONFREE 0.0011***
0.009***
0.014
(0.0003)
(0.0022)
(0.0218)
ETHFRAC
-0.0323*** -0.2683***
-0.4172
(0.0096)
(0.0742)
(0.5711)
PRESSFRE
0.0004***
0.003***
0.0047
(0.0001)
(0.0009)
(0.0075)
CPI
=0
=1
=2
*
DECENTRA
0.0000
0.0005
0.0005
(0.0000)
(0.0003)
(0.0019)
ECONFREE 0.0002*** 0.0028***
0.0031
(0.0001)
(0.0008)
(0.0108)
ETHFRAC
-0.0053*** -0.0762***
-0.0857
(0.0018)
(0.0255)
(0.2787)
PRESSFRE
0.0000**
0.0007**
0.0008
0.0000
(0.0003)
(0.0029)

=3
-0.0024
(0.0035)
-0.0087
(0.0084)
0.2156
(0.1552)
-0.0088
(0.0105)
=3
0.0017
(0.0031)
0.0133
(0.0265)
-0.3984
(0.85)
0.0045
(0.0082)
=3
0.0011
(0.0012)
0.0067
(0.0067)
-0.183
(0.1924)
0.0017
(0.0022)

=4
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.0036
(0.0024)
0.089
(0.0744)
-0.0036
(0.0025)
=4
-0.0005
(0.0012)
-0.0043
(0.009)
0.13
(0.276)
-0.0015
(0.003)
=4
0.0019
(0.0013)
0.0116**
(0.0047)
-0.3154*
(0.1648)
0.003**
(0.0012)

=5
-0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0005
(0.0004)
0.0114
(0.0124)
-0.0005
(0.0005)
=5
-0.0018
(0.002)
-0.0142
(0.0141)
0.424
(0.4167)
-0.0048
(0.0047)
=5
0.0024
(0.0038)
0.0147
(0.0204)
-0.4001
(0.5874)
0.0038
(0.0055)

Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses; Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

=6
-0.0014
(0.0019)
-0.0111
(0.0158)
0.3325
(0.466)
-0.0038
(0.0055)
=6
-0.0021
(0.0013)
-0.0127
(0.008)
0.346
(0.2144)
-0.0033
(0.0022)

=7
-0.0006***
(0.0002)
-0.0052**
(0.0021)
0.1543**
(0.0658)
-0.0017**
(0.0008)
=7
-0.0037***
(0.0009)
-0.0227***
(0.0065)
0.6196***
(0.203)
-0.0058**
(0.0028)

=8
=9
-0.0002
-0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001)
-0.0018 -0.0007**
(0.0011) (0.0003)
0.0548
0.0206**
(0.0351) (0.0099)
-0.0006 -0.0002**
(0.0004) (0.0001)
=8
=9
-0.0006
0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0000)
-0.0035* -0.0001**
(0.0019) (0.0001)
0.0962*
0.0039*
(0.051) (0.0022)
-0.0009
0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0000)
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Table 5. Panel Data Estimations
Dependent Variable:
Constant
Subnational Share of Total Government Expenditures
Economic Freedom Index
Freedom of Press Index
Ethnic Fractionalization Index

Political Risk Due to Corruption

***

4.09
(13.98)
-0.008**
(-2.42)
-0.02***
(-2.65)
-0.02***
(-5.81)
1.27***
(4.71)

µ1
µ2
µ3
µ4
µ5
Method of Estimation
Hausmann test: H value
# observations
R2 (Pseudo R2)
Log Likelihood Function
Source: See Table 1.
t-statistics are in parentheses

Random Effects
3.98
248
0.47

-0.014*
(-1.83)
-0.03**
(-2.41)
-0.05***
(-6.94)
2.41***
(4.36)
1.77***
(11.74)
3.25***
(21.41)
5.84***
(25.65)
8.61***
(16.25)
7.50***
(12.1)
Ordered Logit
280
0.19
-354.17
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Table 6. Marginal Effects for Ordered Logit Models
CORICRG
=0
=1
ECONFREE
0.0022***
0.0024**
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
PRESSFRE
0.0031***
0.0032***
(0.0007)
(0.0010)
ETHFRAC
-0.1771***
-0.1885***
(0.0423)
(0.0521)
DECENTRA
0.0010***
0.0011**
(0.0004)
(0.0005)

=2
0.0006
(0.0022)
0.0009
(0.0030)
-0.0506
(0.1799)
0.0003
(0.0010)

=3
-0.0027***
(0.0004)
-0.0038***
(0.0013)
0.2186***
(0.0487)
-0.0013**
(0.0005)

=4
-0.0019
(0.0015)
-0.0026
(0.0021)
0.1467
(0.1523)
-0.0009
(0.0010)

=5
-0.0006
(0.0007)
-0.0009
(0.0007)
0.0508
(0.0428)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
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Table 7. Summary Statistics, Cross State Data for the USA
Variables

Observations

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Corruption Perception Score a)

45

3.5

1.2

1.5

5.5

Modified Corruption Perception Score b)

45

2.0

1.2

0.0

4.0

Metropolitan Population Share

45

67.1

20.4

27.9

96.7

Average Government Wages Adjusted for Cost of Living

45

2722

313

2266

3544

Educational Attainment

45

83.6

4.2

76.3

90.7

Local Share of State and Local Government Expenditures

45

53.8

7.5

35.3

67.0

Local Share of State and Local Government Revenues

45

40.7

6.8

19.7

55.7

Own Source Revenues as a Share of Total Local Government Revenues

45

61.1

6.2

44.5

71.3

Share of Local Government Expenditures Financed by Own Source Revenues

45

62.6

7.1

45.2

73.6

Local Share of State and Local Government Employment

45

68.8

6.2

46.5

78.2

Number of local governments per 10,000 residents

45

6.0

7.4

0.7

42.6

Source: a) (Boylan and Long 2003)
All other data are from the U.S. Census <www.census.gov>
Data except corruption are averaged over 1997-1999.
b)
Corruption Perception Scores were rounded to get an ordered Corruption Perception Scores.
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Table 8. Ordinary Least Square Estimates
Dependent Variable:
Constant
Metropolitan Share of State Population
Average Government Wages Adjusted for
Cost of Living
Percent of Population with High School or
Higher Education
Local Share of State and Local Government
Expenditures
Local Share of State and Local Government
Revenues
Own Source Revenues as a Share of Total
Local Government Revenues
Share of Local Government Expenditures
Financed by Own Source Revenues
Local Share of State and Local Government
Employment
Number of Local Governments per 10,000
Residents
Number of Observations
R2

[1]

[2]

11.51***
(4.09)
0.04***
(3.75)
-0.002**
(-2.42)
-0.09***
(-2.47)

11.96***
(4.41)
0.04***
(4.16)
-0.001*
(-1.88)
-0.08**
(-2.34)
-0.043**
(-2.11)

45
0.44

Source: See Table 5.
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data are averaged for the period 1997-1999.

45
0.50

Modified Perception of Corruption
[3]
[4]
[5]
12.25***
(4.74)
0.05***
(4.82)
-0.002***
(-2.96)
-0.07**
(-2.08)
-0.063***
(-3.00)

45
0.54

13.94***
(5.06)
0.05***
(4.83)
-0.002***
(-3.50)
-0.06
(-1.60)

-0.063***
(-2.76)

45
0.53

12.92***
(4.68)
0.05***
(4.48)
-0.002***
(-3.20)
-0.06
(-1.61)

-0.045**
(-2.20)

45
0.50

[6]

[7]

14.80***
(4.86)
0.04***
(3.87)
-0.001*
(-1.94)
-0.10***
(-2.84)

10.59***
(3.81)
0.03**
(2.62)
-0.002**
(-2.34)
-0.07*
(-1.94)

-0.050**
(-2.28)

45
0.50

-0.042*
(-1.81)
45
0.48
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Table 9. Two Stage Least Square Estimates
Dependent Variable:
Constant
Metropolitan Share of State Population
Average Government Wages Adjusted for Cost
of Living
Percent of Population with High School or
Higher Education
Local Share of State and Local Government
Expenditures
Local Share of State and Local Government
Revenues
Own Source Revenues as a Share of Total
Local Government Revenues
Share of Local Government Expenditures
Financed by Own Source Revenues
Local Share of State and Local Government
Employment
Number of Local Governments per 10,000
Residents
Number of Observations
R2 from first stage

Modified Perception of Corruption
[3]
[4]
[5]

[1]

[2]

11.97***
(4.41)
0.04***
(4.14)
-0.001*
(-1.82)
-0.08***
(-2.32)
-0.04
(1.61)

12.21***
(4.70)
0.05***
(4.50)
-0.002***
(-2.92)
-0.07**
(-2.06)

12.51***
(4.01)
0.04***
(3.46)
-0.002**
(-2.39)
0.08*
(1.87)

11.74***
(3.87)
0.04***
(3.10)
-0.002**
(-2.05)
-0.08*
(-1.95)

-15.56
(-0.03)
0.04
(0.45)
-0.005
(-0.09)
-0.02
(-0.01)

[6]
9.55
(0.92)
0.02
(0.19)
-0.001
(-1.20)
-0.05
(-0.25)

-0.055*
(-1.86)
-0.026
(-0.64)
-0.007
(-0.20)
0.413
(0.06)
-0.09
(-0.19)

45
0.61

Source: See Table 5.
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data are averaged for the period 1997-1999.

45
0.43

45
0.11

45
0.12

45
0.46

45
0.20
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Table 10. Ordered Logit Estimations
Dependent Variable:
Metropolitan Share of Population
Average Government Wages Adjusted for
Cost of Living
Percent of Population with High School or
Higher Education
Local Share of State and Local Government
Expenditures
Local Share of State and Local Government
Revenues
Own Source Revenues as a Share of Total
Local Government Revenues
Share of Local Government Expenditures
Financed by Own Source Revenues
Local Share of State and Local Government
Employment
Number of Local Governments per 10,000
Residents
µ1
µ2
µ3
µ4
Percent Correctly Predicted
Log Likelihood Function
Pseudo R2

[1]
0.08***
(2.93)
-0.003
(-1.58)
-0.17*
(-1.68)

15.02***
17.03***
18.75***
21.01***
44
-56.41
0.17

[2]
0.10***
(3.11)
-0.003
(-1.11)
-0.16
(-1.43)
-0.11**
(-1.98)

17.56***
19.89***
21.78***
24.05***
58
-53.46
0.22

Modified Perception of Corruption
[3]
[4]
[5]
0.12***
0.12***
0.11***
(3.67)
(3.24)
(3.21)
**
**
-0.005
-0.005**
-0.004
(-2.1)
(-2.4)
(-2.22)
-0.15
-0.11
-0.12
(-1.15)
(-0.96)
(-1.06)
-0.17***
(-2.78)

20.02***
22.61***
24.52***
26.93***
51
-51.09
0.25

-0.16**
(-2.53)

23.27***
25.61***
27.40***
29.91***
40
-52.53
0.23

Source: See Table 5. Sample size is 45; Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

-0.10**
(-2.08)

19.97***
22.17***
23.92***
26.38***
38
-53.96
0.21

[6]
0.08***
(2.82)
-0.003
(-1.15)
-0.22*
(-1.83)

[7]
0.06
(1.54)
-0.003
(-1.43)
-0.11
(-0.85)

-0.14**
(-2.03)
26.06***
28.43***
30.27***
32.63***
53
-53.01
0.22

-0.15
(-1.26)
12.48***
14.49***
16.31***
18.96***
51
-53.59
0.21
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Table 11. Marginal Effects for Ordered Logit Models
Estimated Parameters (standard errors in parentheses)
Metropolitan Share of Population
Average Government Wages Adjusted for
Cost of Living
Percent of Population with High School or
Higher Education
Local Share of State and Local Government
Expenditures
Local Share of State and Local Government
Revenues
Own Source Revenues as a Share of Total
Local Government Revenues
Share of Local Government Expenditures
Financed by Own Source Revenues
Local Share of State and Local Government
Employment
Number of Local Governments per 10,000
Residents

Y=0
0.0059*
(0.0032)
0.0001**
(0.0001)
-0.0028**
(0.0011)
0.0034*
(0.0018)
0.0043**
(0.0019)
0.0043**
(0.0021)
0.0031*
(0.0017)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.0038
(0.0025)

Source: See Table 5. Sample size is 45; Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Y=1
0.0268
(0.0126)
0.0005
(0.0002)
-0.0129
(0.0038)
0.0172
(0.0076)
0.0253
(0.009)
0.0261
(0.0102)
0.0175
(0.0083)
0.0216
(0.009)
0.0262
(0.0145)

Y=2
0.0042
(0.2442)
0.0001
(0.0048)
-0.002
(0.1183)
0.0047
(0.1753)
0.0069
(0.2601)
0.0036
(0.2625)
0.0021
(0.1644)
0.0055
(0.2512)
0.0017
(0.2474)

Y=3
-0.0272
(0.0911)
-0.0005
(0.002)
0.0131
(0.049)
-0.0204
(0.0793)
-0.0308
(0.1265)
-0.0275
(0.1247)
-0.0178
(0.075)
-0.0251
(0.1089)
-0.024
(0.1245)

Y=4
-0.0097
(0.0234)
-0.0002
(0.0005)
0.0047
(0.0118)
-0.005
(0.0138)
-0.0056
(0.0161)
-0.0065
(0.0211)
-0.0049
(0.0152)
-0.006
(0.0161)
-0.0077
(0.0228)
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